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ARBITRATION, LABOR CONTRACTS, AND THE ADA: THE
BENEFITS OF PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
AN UPDATE ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DUTY TO
ACCOMMODATE AND SENIORITY RIGHTS
Jan William Sturner"
I. INTRODUCTION

President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA or
the Act) into law on July 26, 1990, and the Act became effective two years
later on July 26, 1992. Title I of the ADA, which is enforced by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), protects individuals with
disabilities from employment discrimination.2 To further the goal of
eradicating disability bias in the workplace, the United States Congress
(Congress) intended that alternative dispute resolution processes would be
utilized, at least in part, to resolve employees' ADA claims. The monetary
costs, time consumption, negative publicity, and procedural complexities and
rigidity often associated with the court system suggest that more practical and
flexible alternatives to traditional litigation, such as arbitration,3 are attractive

* B.A., Brown University (1994); J.D., University of Arkansas School of Law (1997);
LL.M., Labor and Employment Law, Georgetown University Law Center (1998). Mr. Sturner
is an associate with Institutional Labor Advisors, LLC, McLean, Virginia, a firm counseling
employers on all aspects of labor and employment law. His practice includes the representation
of union and non-union companies in litigation and administrative matters, compliance with
federal and state employment statutes, due diligence for mergers and acquisitions, and collective
bargaining. The author would like to acknowledge and thank Professor James Oldham for his
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See Pub.L.No.101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
3. See HENRY H. PERRrT, JR., AMERIcANS WITH DISABILIES ACT HANDBOOK § 9.22,
at 404 (3d ed. 1997), for a definition of "arbitration" in a labor/employment context.
Arbitrationis a private adjudicatory process that produces a binding decision. The
power of an arbitrator derives from an arbitration agreement, which may be entered
into for a class of potential disputes before they arise, as in a typical collective
bargaining agreement, or in a postdispute agreement that, in effect, provides for
settlement of the claim through arbitration. Arbitration awards are enforceable
under the Uniform Arbitration Act, which has been enacted by 35 states, and under
the United States Arbitration Act. Both acts require courts to defer to arbitration
decisions and allow overturning (impeaching) an arbitration award only on limited
grounds.
Id. Labor arbitration awards, which arise out of collective bargaining agreements, can be
enforced and challenged under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). In addition to arbitration's role in a labor (i.e., unionized) context,
arbitration processes are also used extensively for resolving disputes arising out of commercial
contracts and individual agreements.
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possibilities for potential disputants.4
Moreover, in the union/employer grievance-arbitration context,5 where
external laws are often a secondary consideration, or simply not contemplated
at all within the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the Act has begun
to reshape the landscape. The mandates of the ADA have compelled labor
arbitrators to scrutinize closely how and when the external law of the Act
should interact with, supplement, or perhaps even supersede the "law of the
shop" in the resolution of contractual disputes arising out of collective
bargaining agreements.
Considering Congress's approval of voluntary alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms as a means for enforcing the ADA's provisions, the
legal community should continue to support the facilitation of mandatory and
binding arbitral processes that are procedurally sound and achieve fair andjust
results in both unionized and non-unionized workplaces. Whether an ADA
claim is brought in a unionized or non-unionized setting, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements can conserve valuable public and private resources
while also preserving working relationships that might otherwise deteriorate
in the face of protracted litigation.
As a corollary to the virtues ofpre-dispute arbitration agreements, private
and public benefits can also be realized where, in a unionized context, labor
arbitrators take it upon themselves to consider the external law of the ADA,
if indicated, in analyzing contractual grievances. Of course, references to
external law need only occur where a dispute implicates the ADA. However,
even grievances involving purely contractual matters may raise issues related
to employee disabilities. In this regard, arbitrators are at times presented with
grievances that do not specifically reference the ADA, but indirectly involve
disability discrimination issues nonetheless. For example, a grievance might
require the interpretation of language in a labor contract which could
ultimately adversely affect the conditions of employment for an employee or
group of employees who have disabilities. The parties may pursue such a
dispute purely as a contractual matter, without ever recognizing the ADA's
provisions. On the other hand, the parties could be fully aware of the ADA's
relevance to their dispute, yet the arbitration clause in their collective
bargaining agreement may not cover such statutory matters. Or perhaps, the
4. See generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs
7-9 (Martin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (discussing the advantages of
arbitration as opposed to the court system).
5. Grievance arbitration is one of the two types of labor arbitration; it is the process by
which an arbitrator resolves a dispute by interpreting or applying the provisions of a negotiated
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union. See id. at 5-6. The other
kind of labor arbitration is interest arbitration where the arbitrator considers the parties'
individual positions and writes an actual agreement for them. See id. at 128.
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parties may not even be interested in pursuing the claim on a statutory basis.
In these situations, arbitrators must squarely confront not only their contractual duty to interpret the language of the labor agreement, but also their legal
duty to follow congressional mandates under the ADA---even if the relevant
ADA issues are not properly presented for review. Accordingly, arbitrators
should attempt to apply the external law of the Act consistently and uniformly
where it is relevant to contractual labor disputes, even where the Act's
applicability may be peripheral.
Labor arbitrators should maintain a holistic view of their adjudicatory
roles. Admittedly, they act as private umpires for parties to collective
bargaining agreements, but they are also quasi-public gatekeepers not only for
national labor relations policy, but also, at times, for state and federal
employment laws. They must assume such roles notwithstanding the fact that,
technically, they are most often called upon by employers and unions to
construe the more narrow rights and obligations arising out of only the
specific language of individual labor agreements. Where a dispute arising out
of a collective bargaining agreement implicates statutes such as the ADA, an
arbitrator's private contractual duties quickly evolve into a public responsibility to fashion an award that satisfies not only the law of the shop but, more
importantly, the law of the land. A judicial policy of ensuring that arbitral
awards comport with federal anti-discrimination statutes such as the ADA
seems necessary and appropriate, particularly considering Supreme Court
precedent that appears to have authorized arbitrators to incorporate outside
laws into the analyses of their awards.6
In terms of recognizing the provisions of the ADA, arbitrators reviewing
union grievances must be especially aware of an employer's duty under the
Act to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees. Such
cognizance by an arbitrator is particularly relevant where the duty to
accommodate under the ADA may potentially conflict with a term in a
collective bargaining agreement, such as a seniority clause. To ensure
compliance with the Act, and to foster sound public policy, reviewing courts
6. See generally United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593,597 (1960) (ruling that an arbitrator's consideration ofexternal law is appropriate and
observing that an arbitrator "may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award
is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement").
Cf Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) ("The arbitrator, however, has no
general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the partie[s].").
Many subsequent cases have cited Enterprise Wheel for the proposition that an arbitrator is
entitled to apply external sources of law, at least in part, when interpreting the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., National Gypsum Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, 147 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The arbitrator's decision in this case
drew its essence from the agreement, and the arbitrator properly 'looked to the law for help in
determining the sense of the agreement."').
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should not hesitate to overturn arbitration awards that are repugnant to the
mandates of the ADA. In fact, where the ADA is clearly implicated, and
when petitioned to do so, courts should consider vacating or remanding any
award that results in a violation of the ADA, demonstrates a manifest
disregard for the ADA's provisions, or otherwise jeopardizes the important
social policies espoused under the ADA."
ADA claims are ripe for arbitral decisionmaking because they are often
factually dense, communication/negotiation-intensive, and all parties involved
are usually best served by an expedient resolution. This is particularly true
where the ADA's duty to accommodate is the focus of the dispute. A
thorough and streamlined private arbitration process, as opposed to litigation,
is an ideal method for resolving disability disputes in either union or nonunion workplaces. This proposition is supported by the text of the ADA and
other federal laws, the legislative history of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,8 and the prevalence of disability bias in employment, as demonstrated
by the increasing number of claims brought under the Act.

H. THE ADA AND ARBITRATION
A.

The Text of the ADA and Other Federal Laws

Section 513 of the ADA,9 entitled "Alternative Means of Dispute
Resolution," clearly sets forth Congress's view of the role of arbitration in
resolving disputes under the Act. Section 513 provides: "Where appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation,
mediation, fact finding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under this Act."'" The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, in
part, amended the ADA," contains an almost identical provision in Section
118 encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution: "Where appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute

7. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text which explain that federal courts can
overturn arbitration awards in instances where an award is contrary to "some explicit public
policy" or where an award is in "manifest disregard of the law."
8. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in various sections of U.S.C.).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
10. Id.
11. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 102, 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072, 1077-78 (1991)
(amending the ADA by allowing for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for
acts of intentional disability discrimination, and by applying the Act's requirements to domestic
employers with employees working in foreign countries).
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resolution, including... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by [this Act]."' 2
Several other federal laws also tend to support a national policy of
utilizing arbitral processes to resolve civil rights and labor issues. These are:
(1) the Federal Arbitration Act 3 (the FAA), which was originally passed in
1925; (2) section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act (the Labor Management
Relations Act), 4 which states: "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon
by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement[;] '"'5 (3) Executive Order 11246, OFCCP
Revised Order Number 4,16 (when coupled with the foregoing language from
the Taft-Hartley Act) which requires federal contractors to "[i]nclude
nondiscrimination clauses in all union agreements, and review all contractual
provisions to ensure they are nondiscriminatory;"' 7 (4) the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act," which implements experimental courtannexed arbitration and provides for mandatory arbitration of civil claims
where the damages sought are less than $100,000; 19 and (5) the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act,2" which directs agencies to encourage the use of
alternative dispute resolution in administrative programs.2

12. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991).
13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994).

15. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994).
16. 4 C.F.R. § 60-2.21(7) (1996).
17. Id. This Executive Order applying to federal contractors, when considered in concert
with section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, implies the existence of a federal policy favoring
and perhaps requiring arbitration of discrimination claims arising in a unionized context. See
generallyStephen W. Skrainka, The Utility ofArbitrationAgreements in Employment Manuals
and Collective BargainingAgreementsforResolving Civil Rights,Age andADA Claims, 37 ST.

Louis U. L.J. 985, 985-87 & n.1 (1993).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994).
19. See id. This provision allows any of the ten judicial districts covered by the program
to adopt a local rule for submission of cases worth $100,000 or less to non-binding arbitration.
The districts involved are: Northern District of California; Middle District of Florida; Western
District of Michigan; Western District of Missouri; District of New Jersey; Eastern District of
New York; Middle District of North Carolina; Western District of Oklahoma; Eastern District
of Pennsylvania; and Western District ofTexas. See generally Skrainka, supra note 17, at 98587 & nn.1 & 5, for a discussion of how the various laws noted above reflect the federal
government's positive view of arbitration as it relates to resolving civil rights claims.
20. 5 U.S.C.
21. See id.

§ 571 etseq. (1994).
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Legislative History of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991

Statements from members of Congress concerning the enactment of the
ADA and the use of arbitration are further illustrative of a policy of supplementing traditional litigation with alternative measures for resolving disputes.
United States Representative Dan Glickman (D-Kan), the author of Section
513 of the ADA, explained: "This provision should serve as a reminder that
rights and litigation are not one in the same. There are better ways to achieve
the goals of the ADA than litigation and we should encourage cooperation in
achieving those goals, not confrontation."2 2
The Conference Report on the ADA, however, also reflects an intent on
the part of Congress to restrict the impact of Section 513. The report states:
"It is the intent of the conferees that the use of alternative dispute resolution
procedures is completely voluntary. Under no condition would an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract prevent
an individual from pursuing their rights under the ADA."23 The conferees also
adopted, by reference, a statement from the House Judiciary Committee
explaining its position on alternative dispute resolution and the ADA:
This amendment was adopted to encourage alternative means of dispute
resolution that are already authorized by law.... The Conferees emphasize that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended
to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by [this Act]. Thus, for
example, the Conferees believe that any agreement to submit disputed
issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected24
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act.
Indeed, the above language does propose limitations on agreements to
arbitrate. Yet, notwithstanding these limitations, other congressional
statements clearly frame the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a body
of law encouraging conservation ofjudicial resources.2 ' For instance, United
States Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan) and Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill)
advocated a more hands-off approach for private agreements to arbitrate

22. 136 Cong. Rec. H2421 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
23. H.R. REP. No. 101-596 (1990), reprintedin 136 Cong. Rec. H4582, 4606 (daily ed.
July 12, 1990) (Joint Explanatory Statement of The Committee of Conference).
24. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76-77 (1990).
25. See generally 136 Cong. Rec. H2599 (1990) (remarks of Rep. Glickman) (explaining
that the ADA "establishes an important principle that we ought to try to avoid litigation.., if
possible, and that encouraging dispute resolution between the parties is a positive ide[a]").
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employment disputes, as is reflected in an interpretive statement placed on the
legislative record for the Civil Rights Act of 1991:26
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including binding arbitration, where the parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use these methods. In light of the litigation crisis facing
this country and the increasing sophistication and reliability of alternatives
to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums.27
Strengthening the sentiment of Senator Dole and Representative Hyde
were the comments of President Bush, who, at the signing ceremony for the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, adopted the above statement and noted that it would
be treated as authoritative interpretive guidance.28 President Bush explained:
[S]ection 118 of the Act encourages voluntary agreements between
employers and employees to rely on alternative mechanisms such as
mediation and arbitration. This provision is among the most valuable in
the Act because of the important contribution that voluntary private
arrangements can make in the effort to conserve the scarce resources of the
Federal judiciary for those matters as to which no alternative forum would
be possible or appropriate.29
Thus, although Congress may not have intended that all arbitration
agreements would necessarily preclude ADA claims, the legislative history of
the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, at a minimum, encourages the use
of mutual efforts to engage in binding arbitration. Congressional intent
appears to reflect at least the potential for sanctioning the preclusive effect of
voluntary binding arbitration on subsequent court actions. In this regard,
precluding court claims is a particularly viable prospect where plaintiffs have
expressly and voluntarily waived their right to assert a cause of action in a
traditional judicial forum.3"

26. See generally supranote 11. As has been noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in part,
amended the ADA.
27. 137 Cong. Rec. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole);
id at H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
28. See E. PATRICK MCDERMoTr AND ARTHUR ELIOT BERKELEY, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE
RESOLUTION INTHE WORKPLACE 13-14 (1996).
29. Statement of President George Bush upon signing S. 1745, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769.
30. See, e.g., Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380, 386 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that
the plaintiff's ADA claim is not subject to a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause,
and plaintiff is not prohibited from pursuing the claim in court because "the ADA's legislative
history very strongly suggests that ADA claims may not be arbitrated in the absence of an
express, voluntary waiver of the right to assert the claim in the courts.").
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The text and legislative history of the ADA, coupled with the existence
of other supporting federal laws, have laid the foundation for employers and
employees to enter into agreements to resolve ADA claims through a
mandatory, exclusive and binding arbitral process. The increasing number of
disability-related claims suggests that such agreements can not only help to
relieve crowded court dockets, but also serve the needs of disputants by
simplifying the resolution procedure and hastening an ultimate determination
on the merits. A faster, less expensive, and more flexible and confidential
process can provide adversaries, who often must maintain ongoing employment relationships, with a more effective means to achieve a fair and final
outcome.
1II. THE INCREASE IN DISABILITY CLAIMS AND THEBENEFITS OF
ARBITRATING DISPUTES BROUGHT UNDER THEADA

A.

ADA Claims on the Rise

As President Bush inferred in his Presidential Statement, upon signing
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law, the process of arbitrating ADA claims
is undoubtedly an "important contribution ...in the effort to conserve the
scarce resources of the Federal judiciary."'" Clearly, if the judiciary's
resources were scarce in the early 1990s, the increase in employment-related
litigation over the past decade has only exacerbated an already difficult
situation. Growing numbers of lawsuits threaten not only public resources,
but also private industry where employers are increasingly bombarded with
both meritorious and, unfortunately, oftentimes frivolous claims.32
31. See supra note 29.
32. See Witnesses Debate Effects of ADA At Civil Rights Commission Hearing, 67
U.S.L.W., Legal News, (BNA), No.19 at 2294 (November 24, 1998). On November 12, 1998,
witnesses testified before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and explained that "[t]he
multiple complexities of the Americans with Disabilities Act have resulted in scores of spurious
lawsuits whose costs are ultimately borne by employers ...." Id.Further testimony also
revealed that "while employers win most lawsuits that charge ADA violations, it costs them
about $150,000 to win each case[.]" Id. Moreover, Anne Reesman, general counsel for the
Equal Employment Advisory Council noted that "the ADA differs from other civil rights laws
in that 'there is no cookie-cutter approach' for determining who is protected under the statute.
As a result, the ADA becomes a 'shield' for nonproductive employees to sue their employe[r]."
Id. (stating further that the "reasonable accommodation" prong of the ADA is a "floating target"
for lawsuits); see also Stephanie Armour, DisabilitiesAct Abused? Law's Use Sparks Debate,
USA TODAY, September 25, 1998, at B I ("Passed in 1990 to widespread praise, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) now is being targeted by critics who say it has led to too many
spurious claims."). "'What has happened is that many, many employees believe-sometimes
wrongly-that they're covered [by the Act]. It's being misused. It's used as a club against
employers." Id.(citing Jefferey Sheldon, a Washington, D.C. lawyer specializing in labor).
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Public opinion polls reflect our society's growing litigiousness,
especially in the employment context. In a 1990 survey by the NationalLaw
Journal,sixty-two percent of respondents indicated that they would be more
willing to bring legal action on account of employment discrimination than
they would have five years previously.33 In addition, one-quarter of the
respondents stated they had personally experienced job bias.34 The same poll
revealed that seventy-eight percent of American adults believe some, most, or
all employers discriminate to some degree when hiring or promoting
employees.35
Further statistical evidence also supports the conclusion that employment
litigation continues to rise. Approximately one year following the ADA's
effective date of July 26, 1992, a survey of activity among federal district
courts revealed that civil filings had increased to 228,162 with a twenty-five
percent increase from the previous year in employment-related claims.36
These figures have continued to soar as more federal and state anti-discrimination legislation has been enacted, and courts have continued to develop,
redefine and broaden existing legislation. In fact, employment-related claims
commenced in federal district courts have risen from an annual total of 13,650
in 1993, to 24,174 in 1997.37 Moreover, the number of ADA claims filed with
the EEOC has reportedly risen from an annual total of 15,099 in all of 1993,
to 18,045 as of only September 30, of the 1997 calendar year.38 In addition,
according to these partial annual statistics for 1997, disability claims
accounted for 22.4% of all charges filed with the EEOC, which include claims
based on race, sex, national origin, religion, retaliation, age and the Equal Pay
Act.

39

33. See Randall Samborn, Many Americans FindBiasat Work, NAT'LL.J., July 16, 1990

at 1.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See AdministrativeOffice ofthe US. Courts,FederalJudicialWorkloadStatistics2-3

(1993).
37. See StatisticalTablesfor the FederalJudiciary,Table C-2A, U.S. DistrictCourts Civil
Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit During the 12 Month Periods Ended Dec. 31, 1993

through 1997 (Jan. 30, 1998) (provided by Gwendolyn W. Coleman, on March 18, 1998, from
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistics Division, Washington D.C.).
38. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,Americans with DisabilitiesAct of
1990-Statistics,FY 1992 -through- FY 1997 (1998) (provided by David Grinberg, on March

18, 1998, from the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs at the EEOC headquarters
in Washington, D.C.); see also Armour, supra note 32, at 2B. "More than 90,800 charges
under the ADA were filed between July 1992 and September 1997 with the EEOC. The claim
most often cited was back impairment, followed by emotional/psychiatric impairments. Nearly
3,000 cases were for substance abuse; more than half the charges involved claims of wrongful
discharge." Armour, supra note 32, at 2B.
39. See Charge Statisticsfrom the US. Equal Employment OpportunityCommission, FY
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Observers point to a number of factors as possible causes for the
litigation boom. These include: (1) increasing unemployment;40 (2) the
demographic expansion in the legally protected applicant pool and work force
(e.g., greater numbers of females entering the work force, an older work force,
and increasing minority participation); 4' (3) "a possible cohort effect wherein
younger females and minorities refuse to tolerate discriminatory treatment
experienced by their predecessors and have a readily accessible white male
coworker against whom they can compare their treatment in the labor
market;"" (4) more aggressive enforcement offederal anti-discrimination laws
by government agencies;4 3 (5) modem legislation broadening the scope of
protected classes of workers and increasing the economic rewards for
prevailing plaintiffs;" (6) more aggressive pursuit of litigation by lawyers;45
(7) greater litigiousness on the part of employees on account of declining
employee loyalty as well as lesser employer loyalty toward workers;' (8)
nuances in legal theories facilitating more meritorious causes of action (e.g.,
reverse discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
extension of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1866] to employment contracts); 47 and (9) "clumsy downsizing by many employers with
resultant exposure to employment law litigation, compounded by the decline
of promotional opportunities and economic security among those employees
remaining after the downsizing."4
More voluntary agreements to submit ADA suits to binding arbitration
would greatly assist in curbing the flood of disability-related claims brought
to the EEOC and to the court system. Private arbitration clearly benefits not
only the overwhelmed governmental entities charged with the ADA's
enforcement but also offers participants a variety of benefits not available to
the traditional court litigant.

1991 through FY 1997, (provided by David Grinberg on March 18, 1998 from the Office of
Communications and Legislative Affairs at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Headquarters in Washington, D.C.).
40.

See MCDERMOTr & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.

41. See McDERMoTr & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
42. See McDERMOTr & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24 (citing Peter Kuhn, Sex
Discriminationin Labor Markets: The Role ofStatisticalEvidence, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 567,
579 (1987)).
43. See MCDERMOTT & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
44. See McDERMoTT & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
45. See McDERMoTr & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
46. See MCDERMOT-r & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
47. See McDERMoTT & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
48. McDERMoTr & BERKELEY, supra note 28, at 24.
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The Benefits of Using Arbitration as an Alternative

As a preliminary matter, arbitration is designed to be less expensive than
the courtroom process, primarily because discovery is often significantly
limited.4 9 Arbitration is also less time-consuming than a formal lawsuit and
yields a more rapid outcome.5" The brevity of the process allows the parties
to consider more settlement options as well, since reinstatement and
outplacement may still be possibilities in the early stages of a dispute. 5'
Furthermore, considering arbitration is a private adjudicatory scheme, the
flexibility of the process is a primary advantage over the more rigid court
system both in terms of procedure and remedies. The vagaries and unpredictability of jury verdicts are also avoided where arbitration is utilized, and a
skilled arbitrator or panel of arbitrators is called upon to render a decision.
Indeed, arbitrators trained in the field of employment laws and labor relations
are far better equipped to make sound determinations of fact and law than a
juror who has little or no equivalent training.52 In this regard, comprehending
the detailed and factually-dependent provisions of the ADA can be especially
difficult for jurors. Jury decisions in ADA claims are arguably more
susceptible to legal error than the analysis of a qualified arbitrator. As one
observer has indicated: "The ADA is a complex piece of legislation and it can
be considered advisable under the appropriate fact pattern that it be interpreted
by those familiar with the field of labor relations. Juries, by contrast, tend not
to appreciate the legal principles involved."5 3 A further benefit of arbitration
is that it "offers employees a guarantee that there will be a hearing on the
merits of their claims; no such guarantee exists in litigation where relatively
few employees survive the procedural hurdles necessary to take a case to trial
in the federal courts."54 Finally, the arbitration process can be confidential,
49. See FRANK ELKouRI & EDNA ASPER ELKoURi, How ARBITRATION WORKS 7 (5th ed.
1997).
50. See id at 13.
51. See id; Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Arbitrationdnd the ADA: Do the Two
Make Strange Bedfellows?, 37 RES GESTAE 168, 171 (1993) (explaining the benefits and
drawbacks of arbitration and noting that in 1977, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service reported that it had resolved hundreds of cases between employers and individual
employees through arbitration in an average per-case time of 268 days).
52. See ELKouRi & ELKOuRI, supra note 49, at 8; Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 51, at
171 & n.28 (noting that because of their experience, arbitrators "are better able to understand
the dynamics of the workplace and what behavior does and does not constitute
'discrimination.') (citing United States Steelworkers v. Warrior and GulfNavigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 580 (1960) for the proposition that "the Supreme Couri has admitted that arbitrators
are better decision-makers in the area of labor disputes.").
53. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 51, at 171.
54. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2 1

unlike a trial that can expose an employer to negative publicity as well as
place an employee in an undesirable spotlight. Arbitration allows resolution
and perhaps settlement in a private, internal setting which may foster more
cooperative attitudes. This can be immensely beneficial where the employer
and employee contemplate the possibility of an ongoing working relationship
during and following the arbitration process.
Although private arbitration processes can be criticized as contrary to the
traditional legal tenet of stare decisis and the need for public awareness of
judicial decisions and interpretations of the ADA,55 such arguments appear to
have limited validity. Arguably, every case brought under the ADA,
particularly "reasonable accommodation" claims,56 must be decided on their
own merits because of the individual nature of an employee's disability and
the specific circumstances of each employer's workplace conditions. The
facts of each case are often so unique, especially where a reasonable
accommodation is sought, that a decision in one instance would likely never
suffice as the sole precedent to determine the outcome of another. In this
sense, proper application of the Act's interpretive guidelines to the facts in
question can be equally if not more important than reliance upon previous
decisional law. 7
Moreover, although arbitration may not yield ajudicial opinion for public
review, the confidential arbitral process may in fact produce a more practical
and beneficial result for a disabled employee whose most immediate concern
is often that of returning to work without being subjected to hostility or other
animosity from his or her employer or coworkers. Indeed, Congress enacted
the ADA "to establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of disability," and to assimilate qualified individuals with
disabilities into the social and economic mainstream of American life.5" It
55. See, e.g,. id., at 1476-77 (stating that "[t]he fundamental distinction between
contractual rights, which are created, defined, and subject to modification by the same private
parties participating in the arbitration, and statutory rights, which are created, defined, and
subject to modification only by Congress and the courts, suggests the need for a public, rather
than private, mechanism of enforcement for statutory rights[;]" and also explaining that
"U]udicial decisions create binding precedent that prevents a recurrence of statutory violations;
it is not clear that arbitral decisions have any such preventive effect").
56. See infranotes 60-68 and accompanying text for an explanation of an employer's duty
of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA.
57. See generally Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("Most employment discrimination claims are entirely factual in nature and involve well-settled
legal principles ....
In fact, one study done in the 1980s found that discrimination cases involve
factual claims approximately 84% of the time.").
58. SeeH.R. REP. NO. 101-485(I),(1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303. Notably,
"[i]nitial signs suggest that the [ADA] has made some difference. The most recent data from
the U.S. Census Bureau show there were an additional 800,000 severely disabled people
working in 1994 than in 1991, a 27% jump." Armour, supra note 32, at BI. Although the
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follows that the privacy of arbitration, although seemingly counterintuitive to
the concept of public awareness and stare decisis, may do more to foster the
intended purposes of the Act then would the publicity of the traditional
judicial process. Simply put, arbitration, as opposed to a trial, can offer
employees with disabilities an opportunity to return to work more often, more
quickly, and more amicably.59
numbers are improving, the changes are occurring slowly as evidenced by the Census study's
further finding that "U]ust more than half of the roughly 29 million working-age people with
disabilities were employed in 1994[.]" Armour, supra note 32, at B 1.
However, observers have. recognized that sociological issues create difficulties in
attempting to gauge how effective the Act has been in assimilating the disabled community into
the workforce. For example, at a recent hearing before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
held November 12, 1998, the commission received testimony explaining that:
• . . [T]hrough the mid-1990s, the employment rate for disabled people
decreased while the number of people receiving Social Security disability benefits
increased.
But the correlation has "nothing to do with the ADA,".... Rather, the
employment rate for people with disabilities is most closely related to the economy.
Today's Social Security disability benefits rolls reflect the recession earlier in the
decade ....
... [C]hanges in Social Security regulations and a weak economy in the early
1990s caused an increase in the number of people applyifig for benefits. Because
there are no partial or time-limited benefits from SSA, people who get on those rolls
"stay there for some time,"....
The monetary aspects of Social Security rarely act as incentives for people to
seek benefits .... Rather, the eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid that comes with
becoming a Social Security benefit recipient is the major factor that drives people
to apply for benefits.
Witnesses Debate Effects of ADA at Civil Rights Commission Hearing, 67 U.S.L.W. 2294,
2294-95 (1998) (quoting John Bound, of the Population Studies Center, and Ken Nibali,
associate commissioner for programs and policy in the Social Security Administration's Office
of Disability).
59. See generally LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION § 23.03[9][a], at 23-29 (Tim
Bornstein et al. eds., 1997). As the following passage indicates, the prospect of reemployment
is crucial to workers with disabilities:
Some arbitrators requiring accommodation have been moved by the serious
difficulties that the physically or mentally disabled worker would confront in
seeking employment. They have been concerned that a worker dismissed for a
disability will face the prospect of long-term, ifnot permanent, unemployment. This
concern is very real. One study has shown that two-thirds of all disabled employees
who are not reemployed by their employers could not achieve gainful employment
in the succeeding five years. Conversely, if rehired by the original firm, the
employee was found to be "assured of relative success in future labor market [sic]."
Id. (internal footnotes omitted) (citing, for one, a study contained in A.J. Jaffee et al., Disabled
Workers in the Labor Market, 73, 75-76 (1964)).
A recent newspaper article reported on the current state of affairs for disabled employees
and job applicants in the workforce. See Employees with Disabilities More Visible in
Workforce, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 7, 1998, at 2D. The article explained: "While at
least two-thirds of the 15 million Americans with severe disabilities remain idle - even while
surveys show most want to work - those with jobs are proving their versatility and becoming

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Thus, the argument that the arbitral process is flawed because of minimal
public disclosure appears to overestimate the possible negative impact of
arbitration on future ADA claims. It also underestimates the ability of present
and future plaintiffs to attain justice through private arbitration regardless of
whether the parties fail to establish binding legal precedent in the process.
Furthermore, the element of privacy is unquestionably a fundamental benefit
of using the arbitration system if for no other reason than the presence of a
confidential environment where plaintiffs with legitimate claims can come
forward where they otherwise might not due to a fear of reprisals. In sum, the
private arbitral process provides employers and employees with a chance to
resolve their differences in a setting that will not expose either of them to an
unwanted public eye. This benefit does not differ greatly from the advantages
of a confidential settlement agreement in a traditional litigation context.
The benefits of arbitration are perhaps even more pronounced when
considered in the light of an employer's duty to provide a reasonable
accommodation to employees with disabilities. The efficiency of arbitration
allows both the employer and employee to reach a quick and relatively
painless solution to the oftentimes complex and amorphous accommodation
issue. The brevity and intimacy of the process can effectively put the
employee back to work and the employer's business back in motion before
substantial damage is done to the working relationship.
C.

Resolving the Reasonable Accommodation Issue Through Arbitration

The ADA is a unique piece of civil rights legislation. Its provisions not
only prohibit disability discrimination but also require active participation on
the part of an employer in assimilating individuals with disabilities into the
workforce. In this regard, an employer is required to make "reasonable
more visible than ever in the nation's workplaces." However, "[pleople who are learningimpaired just like those who are blind or use wheelchairs, lag far down the disability ranks in
their ability to find jobs" primarily because of"misinformation, fear and ignorance." The article
also reported that Frank Bowe, a professor of special education at Hofstra University, who is
deaf himself, asserted that other hurdles, aside from discrimination, also exist: "Many people
with disabilities have low levels of education, cannot find jobs that pay better than welfare or
cannot afford to live nearjobs they're offered." Professor Bowe nonetheless noted that "'[great
things are happening which are very encouraging to break down stereotypes, but for the large
number of people with a disability, it's slow slogging, slower that [sic] anyone would like it to
be'." Referencing the Civil Rights Act of 1964's "uphill drive against racial discrimination"
Professor Bowe surmised that "another decade or two might slip by before the far reaching
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 can make a real difference." The article concluded by
citing more positive statistics: "There are heartening trends. Education rates are rising: 75
percent of people with disabilities finished high school in 1994, up from 60 percent in 1986, and
college enrollment jumped from 29 percent to 44 percent." Id.
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accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations" of otherwise
qualified applicants or employees to enable such individuals to perform their
jobs.'
The reasonable accommodation prong of the ADA represents the basis
for a large percentage of all claims brought under the Act. In fact, from July
26, 1992, the effective date of the ADA, until September 30, 1997, the EEOC
received a total of 26,302 charges from claimants alleging failures by
employers to provide a reasonable accommodation. 6' This number represents
29.0% of the 90,803 total ADA charges received during the reporting period,
which included categories of disability claims involving discharge (52.3%),
harassment (12.6%), hiring (9.4%), discipline (8.0%), layoff (4.5%),
promotion (3.9%), benefits (3.8%), wages (3.5%), rehire (3.3%), and
suspension (2.3%).62 As these statistics indicate, the only more frequently
cited violation was "discharge," which accounted for 47,510 charges or 52.3%
of the total number of violations. 3
The ADA's mandate to provide a reasonable accommodation to qualified
individuals with disabilities, in a sense, places an affirmative duty upon
employers to engage in "non-discrimination." Reasonable accommodations
may involve changes in both the work site and general working conditions.
Examples are physical alterations to improve accessibility, restructuring or
reassigning of tasks, or modifications of work schedules. 65 An employer is not
required to provide an accommodation, however, if an employee fails to
inform the employer of his or her need," or if the proposed accommodation
would impose an "undue hardship" on the employer's business. 67
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9, and
Appendices (1996); see generally James W. Bucking, Beyond the ADA: Protection of
Employees with Drug andAlcohol Problems in Arbitration, 11 LAB. LAW. 1, 3 (1995) ("One
of the things that sets the ADA apart from other civil rights legislation is the specific statutory
requirement, not only forbidding discrimination against disabled employees, but also requiring
employers to make reasonable accommodations to allow an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability to perform the job.").
61. See Equal Employment OpportunityCommission, Cumulative ADA ChargeDatafor
the July26, 1992-September30, 1997 ReportingPeriod,(1998) (provided by David Grinberg,
on March 18, 1998, from the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs at the EEOC
headquarters in Washington, D.C.).
62. See id. The percentages of all types of claims add up to more than 100% because
individual charges often alleged multiple violations. See id.
63. See id
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1996) ("The obligation to make reasonable accommodation
is a form of non-discrimination.").
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
66. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1996) ("[It is the responsibility of the individual with a
disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.").
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1996). Factors which are
to be considered in the determination of an undue hardship are: (1) The cost and nature of the
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The ADA's provisions prescribe a fact-intensive, "interactive process"6
between the employer and employee to determine the exact nature of the
accommodation required and whether the employer can actually provide what
may be needed. This interactive process is best accomplished when an
expedient result can be reached and the working relationship between the
employer and employee can persevere notwithstanding the potential for
conflict. Thus, claims asserting a failure by an employer to provide a
reasonable accommodation appear to be particularly well-suited for resolution
through a private arbitration process. As has been surmised by Garylee Cox,
the Vice President for Governmental Relations of the American Arbitration
Association since October 1994:
[Alternative Dispute Resolution] is very suitable for the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA") because ofthe "undue hardship" [and reasonable
accommodation] clause. There are a number of factors that may impact the
ADA. One example is biotechnology. Presently, we are on the threshold
of some amazing breakthroughs, such as helping the blind by implanting
an optic nerve and enabling them to see, light-weight prostheses that enable
people who are almost crippled to participate in strenuous athletics, and
cochlear implants that may make deafness a thing of the past. The same
thing is happening in the workplace. Technological advancements such as
voice-activated computers and employees connected to the Internet to
interface with headquarters offices may enable more people to work at
home. This is not just going to be a boon to the disabled, it will be a boon
for people with small children or others in the work force who have special
needs.
The delays in administrative remedies and litigation may cause a
court decision to be obsolete by the time it is rendered. It is possible that
in the five years it takes to litigate a reasonable accommodation claim or
some other issue, technology will overtake it and make the final decision
moot....
We have to fimd... a quicker way for those protected to assert claims
and get a remedy. If you are looking for employment, you cannot afford
to wait in the wings for years. While awaiting litigation, the targets of
discrimination continue to suffer, to lose promotional opportunities, and to
experience escalating hostility in the workplace if the claim is found to be
without merit. It is a very uncomfortable situation. Every time the litigant
walks through the office, and I have seen. it in my own office, people say,

accommodation sought; (2)the financial resources of the facility in question; (3)the financial
resources of the entire entity; and (4) the type of operations involved. See 42 U.S.C. §
12111(10) (1994).

68. See 29 C.F.R. § 1603.3(o)(3) (1996).
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"there's the person asserting this silly claim." For all parties, it's better to
resolve it quickly.69

Scholars have also indicated that ADA claims could be dealt with most
appropriately by using alternative dispute resolution to resolve difficult factual
issues that lie at the heart of employer compliance:
As many observers have noted, this new law explores uncharted
waters and will likely lead to many controversies and disputes as it
becomes more clear over the next few years. For example, in considering
an employee with a disability for a job or promotion, it is crucial that the
candidate be able to perform the "essential functions" of the job. A job
candidate must be "otherwise qualified" with or without accommodation
.ofthe disability by the employer. A job candidate is entitled to "reasonable
accommodation" by an employer, as long as it does not cause an "undue
hardship" on that employer. Certainly for both the employee and the
employer, ADR procedures would appear to be necessary to avoid
protracted and costly legal or administrative proceedings which will
inevitably emanate from a new and somewhat vague law with society-wide
coverage.7"
The arbitral process is suitable for many causes of action arising out of
the ADA.7 The simplicity and privacy of arbitration can allow an employer
69. Garylee Cox, The AppropriateArena for ADA Disputes: Arbitrationor Mediation?,

10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 591, 591-93 (1995).
70.

E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT & ARTHUR ELIOT BERKELEY, ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE

RESOLUTION INTHE WORKPLACE 14 (1996).
71. Although other alternative dispute resolution processes are beyond the scope of this
paper, mediation could also serve as an effective mechanism for resolving ADA claims.
Mediation has been defined by the American Arbitration Association as "intervention by an
impartial third person with the purpose of helping the parties reach their own solution."
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, A MODEL SEXuAL HARASSMENT CLAIM RESOLUTION

PROCESS 6 (1994). Thus, mediation differs from arbitration in that the latter usually involves
a final and binding decision by an neutral third party, whereas a mediation process usually
requires the third party to act only as a facilitator, and to allow the parties themselves to reach
an agreement. A mediation agreement is enforceable under state contract law, whereas an
arbitration award can be enforced either under federal labor laws, see 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1994)
(section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act), if the award results from a labor arbitration
process under a collective bargaining agreement, or under state or federal arbitration acts which
provide for labor and commercial arbitration enforcement.
Notably, the American Arbitration Association has developed a model claim resolution
process for sexual harassment in employment, whereby parties to a dispute first engage in
mediation and, if unsuccessful, they can then submit the claim to binding arbitration. See
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, A MODEL SExuAL HARASSMENT CLAIM RESOLUTION
PROCESS 6 (1994). This combination of mediation and arbitration (also known as "med/arb")
involves intensive investigation by a-"Factfinding Team" which delivers a "Factfinding Report"
to the respective parties. See id. Such a process could be successfully utilized for disability
claims as well. To date, the American Arbitration Association has not issued a model "med/arb"
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to conform its conduct to the mandates of the Act without the prospect of a
long and grueling court battle and the potential for negative publicity.
Arbitration can also protect the working relationship and provide the parties
with an opportunity to fashion remedies that would not otherwise be available
through the court system. Most important, however, is the fact that arbitration
can be a far more efficient and effective means of uncovering the essential
interests of both parties, and exploring the specific and detailed facts
underlying those interests.
Yet, although the arbitration process can surely benefit parties to an ADA
claim, the legal effect of pre-dispute arbitration agreements can be problematic. The enforceability of agreements to submit statutory claims to a
mandatory and binding arbitration process, as an exclusive substitute for the
traditional judicial forum, (i.e., having the effect of precluding any prior,
simultaneous, or subsequent court claim raising the same statutory issues) has
been a matter of considerable debate. The Supreme Court has considered this
issue both in a collective bargaining context and in an individual contractual
situation, and its decisions have at times led to contradictory results in lower
courts.
On the whole, courts have upheld the enforceability of individual
agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims.. In doing so, courts have
generally required a showing of specific indicia of a clear, knowing, and
process for ADA claims as it has for disputes involving sexual harassment. Telephone Interview
with Jocelyn Learned, Office of D. Breckenridge Grover, Regional Vice-President for the
American Arbitration Association in Denver, Colorado (Mar. 9, 1998). However, draft
standards for mediating ADA disputes have been developed by the ADA Mediation Standards
Work Group, formed by members of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. The
draft standards were released in September and are available on the Internet at
<http://www.mediate.com/articles/adaltr.cfm> on the Mediation Information and Resource
Center's Web site. The deadline for submission of comments on the draft was December 1,
1998.
Presumably, the use of mediation in lieu of, or in combination with arbitration, may
provide parties to an ADA claim (particularly one involving a reasonable accommodation) with
a greater chance for reconciliation and a continuing working relationship once relevant facts and
respective interests are revealed in a less adversarial atmosphere. See generally, Lawyers Offer
Strategiesfor MediatingADA Disputes,ProposingAccommodation,67 U.S.L.W. 2255, 225556 (1998). "Mediation can be conducted in a 'judicial format,' in which the mediator - often
a retired judge- evaluates the case and the likely outcome in court based on previous experience
.
In another format, known as 'process centered,' the mediator identifies the parties'
interests and crafts an agreement with their involvement." Id. at 2256. "An advocate's goal in
mediation is not to persuade the neutral party about the merits of the claim, but 'to help clients
articulate their interests'." Id. at 2255. In terms of the usefulness of mediation in resolving
reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA, one observer noted that "[blecause some
clients may have spurred their employer to 'unnecessary hostility' when they previously tried
asking for an accommodation on their own, advocates [in the mediation process] can play a
helpful role in smoothing things over." Id. at 2256.
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voluntary waiver of statutory rights on the part of the employee. Of importance as well has been the existence of an arbitral forum that can provide a
claimant with a full and fair opportunity to vindicate his or her statutory
rights. However, where parties have sought to enforce analogous arbitration
agreements in union-negotiated labor contracts, courts have not been similarly
receptive.
Almost all federal courts that have considered this issue have recognized
a substantial legal distinction between an individual employee's agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims, and thereby waive his or her statutory right to a
federal forum, and an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement
which similarly purports to waive individual statutory rights. As is evident,
the effect of both types of agreements is the waiver of the right of individual
employees to bring court claims for employment discrimination. Yet, the
substantive difference between such agreements is that in the "individual"
context, one employee is voluntarily waiving his or her rights; whereas in the
"collective" context, a labor organization is waiving the rights of each
employee, ostensibly for the good of the union as a whole in the collective
bargaining process. Along these lines, most courts have recognized that equal
employment opportunity rights are uniquely individual in nature and cannot
be diluted by waivers arising out of majoritarian processes such as collective
bargaining. Thus, federal courts of appeals, except for the Fourth Circuit,
have ruled that a union cannot collectively waive the statutory rights of
individual employees to bring employment discrimination suits in a federal
court forum.
The leading decisions, which have specifically addressed whether a
union's agreement to arbitrate ADA claims can effectively waive the right to
a judicial forum for individual employees, have been handed down by the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. Recently, the Supreme Court granted a petition
for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit in a case that presented the Court
with the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate ADA claims, as
contained in a collective bargaining agreement, is enforceable. Unfortunately,
the Court did not provide substantial additional guidance on the issue of
enforceability, but rather took the opportunity only to clarify the standard for
waiving individual statutory rights in the collective bargaining process. Thus,
the law of whether union agreements to arbitrate individual statutory claims
are enforceable remains in a state of flux.
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IV. THE ENFORCEABILITY OFARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: CASE LAW
A.

The Fourth Circuit: Union Agreements to Arbitrate ADA Claims Can
Be Enforced

In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff who, through a
collective bargaining agreement, voluntarily agreed to submit statutory
disability claims to arbitration, was precluded from having her ADA claim
against her employer heard in federal court because she had failed to utilize
the internal grievance-arbitration process.73 In developing its ruling, the
Austin court relied heavily on legislative intent and the Supreme Court's
landmark opinion in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.74 The Gilmer
opinion held that a securities firm could enforce individual voluntary
agreements with its brokers to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (the ADEA), and thereby preclude the submission and
resolution of such claims in a judicial forum.75 The Fourth Circuit also
bolstered its decision with policy considerations as set forth in several other
Supreme Court opinions espousing the "well-recognized
policy of federal
76
labor law favoring arbitration of labor disputes.
72. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 432 (1996).
73. See id. at 885-86; see also Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.
Va.1998) (following Austin in holding that a plaintiff was required to arbitrate his ADA and
analogous state disability claim where the collective bargaining agreement at issue cohitained
a clear agreement to submit statutory discrimination claims to the arbitral forum). The Fourth
Circuit, in Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1997), reaffirmed its
adherence to Austin, yet found that the collective bargaining agreement in that case did not
require submission ofTitle VII and Family and Medical Leave Act statutory claims to an arbitral
forum. See id.
at 342. The Trans World Airlines court clarified its position on agreements to
arbitrate in a collective bargaining context by explaining that "[t]he question of whether a
collective bargaining agreement submits statutory disputes to arbitration is a matter of contract
law, and 'a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed
so to submit."' Id. at 340 (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475
U.S. 643,648-49 (1986) (internal citation omitted)). Consequently, the Fourth Circuit appeared
to establish a general rule in Trans World Airlines, incorporating the holding in Austin, to the
effect that in order to compel mandatory arbitration of-statutory claims, parties to a collective
bargaining agreement "would not need to mention in their agreement that a statute was the
source of a dispute committed to arbitration as long as it were made clear that their agreement
is sufficiently broad to include the arbitration of such disputes." Id. at 341-42. The Fourth
Circuit explained that the disputed arbitration clause in the instant collective bargaining
agreement was much narrower in scope than the clause at issue in Austin and, as a result, did
not evidence the requisite clarity in its language to require arbitral resolution of the statutory
claims involved. See id.
at 341.
74. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
75. See id at 26.

76. Austin, 78 F.3d at 879 (quoting Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
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The Austin decision strongly endorsed the Gilmer Court's recognition of
the arbitration process as a means of resolving employment disputes that has
come of age. In fact, the Fourth Circuit adopted several applicable portions
of the Gilmer opinion to support its position regarding the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the arbitral process:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.... [A]ttacks on the adequacy
of arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening
the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,"
and as such, they are "far out of step with our current strong endorsement
of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes . .. ."
[H]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue." ... If such an intention exists,
it will be discoverable in the text of the [statute], its legislative history, or
an "inherent conflict" between arbitration and the [statute's] underlying
purposes . . . . "[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.""
The Fourth Circuit, in Austin, also noted with approval that the Gilmer
Court had dismissed various arguments that attempted to cast a negative light
on the arbitral process. The arguments rejected by the Court included
potential bias by arbitration panels, problems associated with limited
discovery, lack of a written opinion leading to decreased public awareness of
discriminatory conduct, ineffective appellate review and disproportionate
bargaining power between employers and employees. 78 The Fourth Circuit
explained that the Gilmer Court "refused to presume that arbitrators would be
biased [and] explained that choosing arbitration means 'trad[ing] the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration."' 79 The Austin opinion also
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1109 (1986), and citing the "Steelworkers Trilogy": United

Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)).
77. Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-82 (citing Gilmer,500 U.S. at 26,28,30 (alterations in original)
(internal citations omitted) and quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 637 (1985) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
78. See id. at 880.
79. See id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S.
at 628)).
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surmised that although the Gilmer Court recognized that the appellate review
process for arbitration awards was indeed limited, the Court asserted that it
was nevertheless adequate to preserve compliance with statutory mandates.8 0
Finally, the Fourth Circuit also favorably referenced the Supreme Court's
determination that a "lack of class actions should [not] bar arbitration, because
individual conciliation should not be barred; and ... the claim of unequal
bargaining power is one that should be decided in individual cases"8 '
The Fourth Circuit based much of its decision in Austin on the contractual language of the collective bargaining agreement at issue. 2 The court
found the language of the labor contract's terms to be sufficiently broad to
demonstrate a clear intent by the parties to provide for mandatory, final, and
binding arbitration as to each complaint involved in the case.83 In summarizing its position, the Austin court opined:
Whether the dispute arises under a contract of employment growing out of
[sic] securities registration application, a simple employment contract, or
a collective bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet been made to
arbitrate the dispute. So long as the agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and
we are of the opinion it should be enforced."
The language of the labor agreement, the text and legislative history of
the ADA, and the Supreme Court's pronounced favor for the arbitration all
provided the Fourth Circuit with the bases for its conclusion. Yet, the
reasoning of the Austin decision did not survive long without challenge.
Critics of the Austin opinion were quick to point out that the Fourth Circuit's
reliance on Gilmer was indeed somewhat tenuous. Gilmer involved an
employee who had voluntarily waived his right to a federal forum through an
individual arbitration agreement. The Austin court, in contrast, involved a
situation where a union, rather than an individual, had purported to waive the
rights of its employee-members through a mandatory arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement.
Although theAustin court recognized the "individual" versus "collective"
distinction, it accorded minimal significance to this apparent conflict. The
Fourth Circuit neatly disposed of this problem by explaining that in the
collective bargaining process, unions had always been allowed to bargain for
and waive certain rights of their constituents, where such rights represented
80. See id.
(citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4).
81. Id.
(citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33).
82. See id.

83. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
84. Id. at 885.
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terms and conditions of employment.8 5 The Austin opinion went on to explain
that "[t]here is no reason to distinguish between a union bargaining away the
right to strike and a union bargaining for the right to arbitrate." 6 Instead, the
bulk of the Fourth Circuit's analysis focused on the seemingly unfaltering
manner in which Congress and the Supreme Court had appeared to embrace
the role of arbitration in labor relations in recent years. Federal courts of
appeals outside of the Fourth Circuit, however, have assigned much greater
legal significance to the distinction between individual and collective/union
waivers of statutory rights.
B.

The Eleventh Circuit: Union Agreements to Arbitrate ADA Claims
Cannot Be Enforced Without Procedural Safeguards

In Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.,87 the Eleventh
Circuit reached a different conclusion than did the Fourth Circuit in Austin.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an employee covered by a collective
bargaining agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause, which
arguably applied to statutory claims, nevertheless retained the right to bring
an ADA suit in federal court.8" The Brisentine court explained that in order
for an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims to be enforceable, it must meet
three requirements: (1) the individual employee, not the union, must agree to
the clause at issue; (2) the agreement must authorize the arbitrator to resolve
federal statutory claims; and (3) the employee must be given the option of
pursuing arbitration of a federal statutory claim if the grievance process
proves to be unsatisfactory. 9
The Brisentine decision relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,90 to support its outcome. In Alexander, a
case decided seventeen years prior to Gilmer, the Supreme Court ruled that a
mandatory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not
foreclose a plaintiff s right to bring a Title VII race discrimination lawsuit.9
The Alexander Court explained that when Congress enacted Title VII, it
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
Id.
117F.3d519(llthCir.1997).
See id. at 526-27.
See id.

90. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
91. See id.
at 59-60. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has been quite clear in
pointing out that the Alexander case did not present the Court with the issue of the
enforceability of an agreement to submit statutory claims to arbitration. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). Instead, Alexander addressed the
distinct issue of whether arbitrating a contractual claim under a labor agreement precludes the
judicial resolution of an analogous statutory claim. See id.
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sought to provide individuals with a right to equal employment opportunities,
and the judicial enforcement of the same, which could not be waived through
the collective bargaining process.92 The Supreme Court opined:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate
his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast,
in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent
statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of
these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both
were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no
inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their
respectively appropriate forums.93
The Court further asserted:
We are also unable to accept the proposition that petitioner waived his
cause of action under Title VII. To begin, we think it clear that there can
be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Tile VII. It is true,
of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to
collective activity, such as the right to strike. These rights are conferred on
employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly
may be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining
agent to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII, on the
other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritarian
processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities.
Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command
that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the
rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under Title
VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver."
Notably, unlike the Brisentine court, the Fourth Circuit in Austin
expressly disavowed the notion that the Alexander opinion retained any
current precedential value. It did so by highlighting the recent shift in federal
policy toward favoring the arbitral process as a means of resolving workplace
disputes. The Fourth Circuit illustrated its point by citing the more recent
Gilmer case in tandem with the legislative history of the ADA and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The Austin court appeared to surmise that the aged and
outdated analysis of Alexander had perhaps been implicitly overruled in
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52 (1974).
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 51-52.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Gilmer, and that Congress and the judiciary had provided a blanket approval
of sorts for all voluntary arbitration agreements, whether individual or
collective in nature. However, the Gilmer opinion never specifically
overruled Alexander, nor purported to modify the Alexander analysis."
Critics nevertheless agree that Gilmer clearly weakened the rationale
supporting the result in Alexander.
As indicated, the Brisentine court assigned great significance to the
Alexander case, notwithstanding thejurisprudential conflict raised by the later
Gilmer opinion. The Eleventh Circuit explained its dependence on the
Alexander opinion on account of the two cases' factual similarities, as
opposed to the Gilmer decision which was unlike Brisentine and Alexander
in several respects.97 The court first noted that the arbitrator in the instant
case, as in Alexander, did not have the authority to resolve statutory claims
under the collective bargaining agreement. 9s In contrast, the agreement in
Gilmer did cover the arbitration of statutory as well as contractual claims."
Moreover, the court rationalized that, as in Alexander, the disparity in interests
between the union and the individual employee weighed against enforcement
of the arbitration clause as the exclusive means for resolving individual
statutory claims." ° In Gilmer, on the other hand, the Supreme Court was
confronted not with a collective bargaining agreement, but with an individual
contractual agreement to submit claims to arbitration."°' Finally, the Eleventh
96. The Supreme Court, in Gilmer, concluded that the Alexander case was in fact
inapposite to its analysis. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (1991). The Court explained:
There are several important distinctions between [Alexander] and the case before us.
First [Alexander] did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, [it] involved the quite different issue whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of
statutory claims. Since the employee[] there had not agreed to arbitrate [his or her]
statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims,
the arbitration in [Alexander] understandably was held not to preclude subsequent
statutory actions. Second, because the arbitration in [Alexander] occurred in the
context ofa collective-bargaining agreement, the [employee was] represented by [his
or her] union[] in the arbitration proceeding[]. An important concern therefore was
the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a
concern not applicable to the present case. Finally, [Alexander was] not decided
under the FAA, which, as discussed above, reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625. Therefore [Alexander]
provide[s] no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate his ADEA
claim.
Id.
97. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 523-25.
98. See id.
at 524.
99. See id.

100. See id.
at 525.
101. See id.
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Circuit noted that the claim in Gilmer implicated the Federal Arbitration Act
(the FAA) whereas neither the Alexander case nor the case at bar were subject
to the FAA because the arbitration clauses in the latter cases arose out of
union/employer labor contracts. 02
The essence of the Brisentine decision is that a labor union, as a
collective entity, cannot waive individual employees' rights to enforce
statutory claims in federal court. However, the Eleventh Circuit did explain
that it would likely enforce an individual employee's voluntary agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims against his or her employer. In fact, the Brisentine
opinion referred, with approval, to the Gilmer case in this regard which
"explained that the concern about the conflict between collective representation and individual statutory rights that was present in Alexander is not present
in the context of individual employment contracts."'' 3 It is quite clear,
102. See id. (noting that "[n]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has decided whether
collective bargaining agreements are subject to the FAA" and explaining that other circuit courts
have reached conflicting results-comparing Pryner v. TractorSupply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 355
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the FAA is generally applicable to collective bargaining
agreements, provided that workers covered by agreement are not engaged in transportation) with
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996) (noting that "in this circuit, the FAA is not applicable to labor
disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements.")). The Fifth Circuit has also
determined that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment excluded from
the application of the FAA. See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 86 (5th
Cir. 1956) rev 'd, 353 U.S. 488 (1957) (holding that the FAA "does not authorize the judicial
enforcement of a contractual undertaking to submit to arbitration grievances arising under a
collective bargaining agreement"). The Ninth Circuit has held that the FAA is not applicable
to labor or employment contracts of any kind. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199,
1206 (9"' Cir. 1998) (basing this conclusion on the language of the FAA, its legislative history,
and applicable Supreme Court precedent).
Although the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the reader should recognize that
section 1 of the FAA excludes from the FAA's coverage "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Some courts, as demonstrated above, have viewed this exclusion as
including all employment contracts, whether individual or collective in nature, and whether or
not they apply to the specific class of workers listed in the statute. Other courts have interpreted
the FAA's language more literally and have applied the exclusion only to "workers actually
involved in the 'flow' of commerce, i.e., those workers responsible for the transportation and
distribution of goods." Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
The Cole court explained: "[O]ur research indicates that every circuit to consider this issue
squarely has found that section 1 of the FAA exempts only the employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce." Id. at 1471 (citations
omitted).
103. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 525 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35). The Fifth Circuit,
following Gilmer, has also upheld the enforceability and preclusive effect of individual
arbitration agreements in securities registration applications in the context of ADEA and Title
VII claims. See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1995). The
Fifth Circuit has also extended the Gilmer analysis to arbitration clauses contained in individual
employment contracts. See Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 218 (5th
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therefore, that under Gilmer and its progeny, individual voluntary agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims can be enforced and can preclude a de novo
judicial determination assuming the arbitral process affords employees an
adequate opportunity to vindicate the full range of their federally-protected
rights. "
Cir. 1997); Rojas v. Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1996). In Miller and
Rojas, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that their employment contracts were
not covered by the FAA, and ruled that, under the FAA, the arbitration clauses at issue
compelled the employees to submit their ADA and sexual harassment claims to the binding
arbitral process. See Miller, 121 F.3d at 218; Rojas, 87 F.3d at 748-49.
Notably, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the application of the Gilmer analysis in the
context of a Title VII claim brought by an employee who had signed a Form U-4 securities
representative's registration application (as had been done in the Gilmercase as well) containing
a mandatory arbitration clause. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1189-90 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that although Gilmer held that an employee's ADEA claim
was subject to an arbitration clause contained in the Form U-4, the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, developed prior to the Gilmer decision, evidenced an intent by
Congress to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII disputes); see also Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998), affd 163 F.3d
53 (1 st Cir. 1998) (noting that the Gilmer analysis is inapplicable to Title VII cases, even where
the Form U-4 has been signed, and is further inapplicable where the adequacy of the arbitral
forum is in question-in this case the court found "structural biases" in the arbitration process
used by the New York Stock Exchange). But see Sues v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175,
183 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 67 U.S.L.W. 3524 (1999) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's
rationale in Duffield regarding the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
holding that a former brokerage employee's race and age discrimination claims were subject to
arbitration under the Form U-4 agreement since Congress had in fact evinced a clear intent to
encourage private arbitral processes for resolving such disputes).
On January 1, 1999, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) changed its
rule which had historically required employees registered with NASD to submit all statutory
employment claims to arbitration. The change specifically excludes statutory discrimination and
harassment claims from the former requirement of mandatory arbitration for all employment
disputes:
The SEC-approved NASD rule change does not require securities firms to drop their
mandatory arbitration programs. Rather, the rule change merely takes NASD out of
the business of dictating that there must be mandatory arbitration clauses in
securities industry employees' contracts. Brokerage firms are not prevented from
including such arbitration requirements in individual contracts.
Paine Webber Allows Bias Claims in Court; Other Brokerages Still MandateArbitration, 67
U.S.L.W. 24, 2374 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1999). Thus, for those individuals associated with NASD
member brokerages, beginning January 1, 1999, the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
securities industry agreements will arise only in the context of individualemployment contracts
rather than as part of an industry-wide "registration" process for employees.
104. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 525; see also Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d
832, 837-38 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e agree with those post-Gilmer decisions which have ruled
that Title VII claims, like ADEA claims, are subject to individual consensual agreements to
arbitrate."); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that
an employee's individual contractual agreement with an employer to arbitrate statutory claims
is enforceable if "the arbitration arrangement (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides
for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types
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Admittedly, the Brisentine analysis finds support in a number of other
circuits that have considered the enforceability of union arbitration clauses for
statutory discrimination claims, other than those brought exclusively under the
ADA. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Penny v. UnitedParcelService,'0 5
the Tenth Circuit, in Harrisonv. Eddy Potash,Inc.,"° the Seventh Circuit, in
Prynerv. TractorSupply Co.,107 the Third Circuit, in Martin v. DanaCorp., 0o
the Eighth Circuit, in Varner v. National Super Markets,"° and the Second
Circuit, in Tran v. Tran,"0 have all found that employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses are
entitled to pursue their statutory claims individually in federal court without
first exhausting the contractual grievance-arbitration machinery. The clear
split between the Fourth Circuit and other circuits, in combination with the
general confusion surrounding the Alexander and subsequent Gilmer
opinions,"' has prompted many observers to look to the Supreme Court for
guidance.

of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay
either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the
arbitration forum.") (emphasis in original)).
105. 128 F.3d 408, 413-14 (6th Cir. 1997) (following Alexander).
106. 112 F.3d 1437, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2364(1997) (adopting
"the majority view ...that Alexander and its progeny remain good law and that statutory
employment claims are independent of a collective bargaining agreement's grievance and
arbitration procedures" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. 109 F.3d 354, 363-65 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 294 (1997) (applying
Alexander in holding that "the union cannot consent for the employee by signing a collective
bargaining agreement that consigns the enforcement of statutory rights to the union-controlled
grievance and arbitration machinery created by the agreement.").
108. 114 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 114 F.3d 428 (upholding the exclusivity of the
arbitration process in a collective bargaining agreement only where the employee could pursue
arbitration without the approval of the union, and where the arbitration clause in question
explicitly provides for arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims).
109. 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997) (applying
Alexander in ruling that that an employee need not exhaust the grievance and arbitration
remedies under a collective bargaining in order to bring a Title VII claim in federal court).
110. 54 F.3d 115, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1995), (construing claim under the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
111. See 12 Lab. Rel. Wk., (BNA)No. 39, at 1092 (Oct. 7, 1998). "Courts have repeatedly
expressed confusion about whether Gilmer effectively overruled [Alexander] as the Fourth
Circuit decided in Austin, or whether Gilmer only applies in cases involving individual
arbitration agreements." Id.
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"Only the Supreme Court can answer th[is] question....,2 The
Wright Case

Although the Brisentine court placed great emphasis on the Alexander
opinion, it also recognized that "It]he Supreme Court's attitude toward
arbitration warmed considerably from Alexander to Gilmer,and may become
warmer still.""' 3 With this premonition in tow, the Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in the Fourth Circuit case of Wright v. UniversalMaritime
Service Corp.,"4 a case which appeared to present squarely to the Court the
important and contentious issues raised by union agreements to submit
individual statutory claims to mandatory and binding arbitration. The Wright
case also appeared to provide the Court with an ideal opportunity to finally
resolve its seemingly conflicting opinions in Alexander andGilmer. However,
the Supreme Court in Wright effectively left these issues in limbo.
In Wright, the Fourth Circuit, following its own analysis in Austin, held
that an employee was required to arbitrate his ADA claims pursuant to an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement." 5 The plaintiff had
claimed that the rule espoused in Austin was inapplicable because the
collective bargaining agreement at issue did not specifically address actions
under the ADA." 6 However, the Fourth Circuit explained that "an arbitration
agreement need not list every possible dispute between the parties in order to
be binding."' 7 The court further instructed:

112. Pryner, 109 F.3d 354, 365 (7th Cir. 1997) (Chief Judge Posner noting that the
Supreme Court should reconcile its past opinions in Alexander and Gilmer, to settle the issue
ofthe enforceability of alabor contract's mandatory and binding arbitration process for statutory
employment discrimination claims).
113. Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d at 526.
114. 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
The following groups signed on to amicus briefs in support of the plaintiff in Wright:
The National Academy of Arbitrators, the AFL-CIO, the International Longshoremen's
Association, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the American Association
of Retired Persons, the National Employment Lawyers Association, the NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Disability Rights
Education & Defense Fund, Inc., the National Partnership for Women and Families, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of South Carolina, and the attorneys general of
thirteen states. See 12 Lab. Rel. Week, (BNA) No. 39, at 1093 (Oct. 7, 1998) ("The large
number of amicus briefs filed in Wright reflects the importance of the issues raised."). The
following groups participated in the filing ofamicus briefs on behalf of the employer in Wright:
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Securities Industry Association, the National Association
of Manufacturers, the Equal Employment Advisory Council, and the Labor Policy Association
of Waterfront Employers. See id.
115. See Wright, No. 96-2850, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1466, at *5.
116. Seeid.at*l.
117. Id.(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
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An employer need not provide a laundry list of potential disputes in order
for them to be covered by an arbitration clause. For example, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.... the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
was required to submit his [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] claim
to arbitration where the arbitration agreement covered "any dispute, claim
or controversy." The language of the [collective bargaining agreement] at
issue in this case is equally broad, covering "all matters" regarding "terms
and conditions of employment." This language easily encompasses
Wright's ADA claim. A narrower interpretation of the agreement would
fly directly in the face of the ADA's statutory preference for arbitration,
and the strong federal policy favoring alternative dispute resolution."'
Upon review, a unanimous Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
Fourth Circuit's decision." 9 In an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia,
the Court found that the "very general" arbitration clause at issue did not
cover statutory claims brought under the ADA. 2 The Court announced that
a presumption of arbitrability, such as that which exists under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act' and the FAA,'22 does not similarly
apply to clauses which are not particularly clear in their coverage of statutory
claims such as the ADA. 2 3 Accordingly, Justice Scalia noted that the
presumption of arbitrability in labor disputes "does not extend beyond the
reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in
a better position than courts to interpretthe terms of a [collective bargaining
agreement]. ' 24 Or, stated differently, where disputants have not otherwise
agreed to arbitrate through specific and unequivocal contractual language,
courts should presume that they are generally better equipped than arbitrators
to resolve statutory discrimination claims. However, it is critical to-recognize
118. Id.(citations omitted) (alterations supplied).
119. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998). See generally
Arguments Before the Court: Americans with DisabilitiesAct Claim; Effect of Arbitration
Clause in Collective BargainingAgreement, 67 U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct. 13, 1998), for a thorough
discussion of oral arguments presented to the Court on October 7, 1998, by the plaintiff's
attorney (Ray P. McClain from Charleston, South Carolina), the defendant's attorney (Charles
A. Edwards from Raleigh, North Carolina), and the Department of Justice and the EEOC ((both
of these agencies were represented by Deputy Solicitor General Barbara D. Underwood).
120. See Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 397.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). See generally Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395 (citing the
Steelworkers Trilogy to demonstrate the concept of a presumption of arbitrability under § 301
of the Labor Management Relation Act).
122. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). See Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395 (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985), where the Court "also
discerned a presumption of arbitrability under the FAA").
123. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 395.
124. Id. (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,650
(1986) and Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960)) (emphasis in original).
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that the Supreme Court in Wright never went so far as to conclude that even
a "very specific" arbitration clause would be valid in the context of the
resolution of statutory claims.
Applying analogous Supreme Court precedent from MetropolitanEdison
Co. v. NLRB,'25 Justice Scalia's opinion posited that a union-negotiated waiver
of an employee's statutory right to ajudicial forum for employment discrimination claims must, at a minimum, be "clear and unmistakable."' 26 Yet, the
Court implied that this minimum standard would not end the inquiry. A
finding of "clear and unmistakable" contractual language would apparently be
only an initial step toward determining whether such a waiver was indeed
valid and enforceable. The Court did not address potential additional steps,
or kinds of proof, that might be required to prompt a finding of validity or
enforceability, if indeed a method of validating or enforcing such a waiver
even exists in this context. Although the Court did not opine in this respect,
such additional proof could include evidence of a "knowing and voluntary"
waiver,'27 and/or evidence of the legitimacy and sufficiency of the arbitral
125. 460 U.S. 693 (1983). The MetropolitanEdison Court considered the issue of whether
a union could waive the statutory rights of its officers under the National Labor Relations Act.
In explaining its position, the Court in Wright favorably quoted the following passage from
MetropolitanEdison: "[W]e will not infer from ageneral contractual provision that the parties
intended to waive astatutorily protected right unless the undertaking is 'explicitly stated.' More
succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable." Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396 (quoting
MetropolitanEdison, Co., 460 U.S. at 708).
126. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.
127. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 163 F.3d 53, 7073 (1' t Cir. 1998) (construing the "analytical rubric" of a"knowing and voluntary" waiver and
quotingAlexanderfor the proposition that: "in determining the effectiveness of any such waiver,
a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee's consent... was voluntary and
knowing"; and also citing the Wright case as a basis for the conclusion that "there be some
minimal level of notice to the employee [whether in a union or non-union contest] that statutory
claims are subject to arbitration"); Doyle v. Raley's, Inc., 158 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that an employee's waiver of judicial forum rights for discrimination claims must be
"knowing") (citing Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1511 (1998) for the proposition that agreements to arbitrate disputes
arising under the ADA and equivalent state laws must at least be knowing, and 29 U.S.C. § 626
(1994) which amended the ADEA by requiring that waivers of rights under the ADEA be
"knowing and voluntary"); see also Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, No. 4:96-3360-22,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3962, at *76-83 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 1998). The Hooters court considered
the characteristics of a valid agreement for an individual employee to waive his/her right to a
federal forum. See id. The court highlighted the fact that the Supreme Court had not yet had
the opportunity to develop a complete standard for judging the validity of such individual
waivers:
The Supreme Court has indicated that an employee could not forfeit substantive
rights under Title VII absent a voluntary and knowing waiver. Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 n. 15 (1974). [However,] [t]he Court has
not reached the issue of the standard applicable to the waiver of the right to litigate
one's Title VII claims in federal court. Gibsonv. NeighborhoodHealth Clinics, 121
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process at issue, particularly in terms of allowances and safeguards for
vindicating the entire spectrum of substantive rights under employment
discrimination statutes. However, the Wright case also presents the possibility
that perhaps a union can never enter into a valid and enforceable waiver of
this sort for its employees, regardless of whether "clear and unmistakable"
language is included in the agreement and irrespective of whether the
agreement is entered into knowingly and voluntarily. The Court's holding
appeared to be deliberately limited so as not to preclude this eventuality.
In any event, the Court did find that the disputed clause in Wright was
indeed too broad to encompass statutory disability claims in a "clear and
F.3d '1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997). In Gilmer, the Court (in dicta) stated that in
agreeing to arbitrate a federal claim, a party "does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded, by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (internal quotations
omitted).
Id. at *79-80. The Hooters court continued by explaining that the Fourth Circuit had "not
addressed the question whether a knowing and voluntary waiver is required for an agreement
to arbitrate a Title VII claim." Id. at *80. However, the Ninth Circuit, in PrudentialIns. Co.
v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995), had ruled that there
must "'be at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee
may be deemed to have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies and procedural
protections prescribed in Title VII and related state statutes."' Hooters, at *78-79 (quoting Lai,
42 F.3d at 1304). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, in Gibson v. NeighborhoodHealth Clinics,
121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997), explained that, "obviously, the strongest case for a court's
finding that an employer and employee agreed to submit claims to arbitration will arise when
the record indicates the employee has knowingly agreed to do so."' Hooters,at *80-81 (quoting
Gibson, 121 F.3d at 1129). Alternatively, the Hooters court recognized that the Eighth Circuit,
in Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,Inc. 113 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1997), "applied ordinary
contract principles in determining whether an employee had agreed to submit Title VII claims
to arbitration." Hooters, at *80.
The rationale of the cases cited in Hooters, although arising in an individual, non-union
context, may be applicable to a case such as Wright. The Wright case has firmly announced the
"clear and unmistakable" threshold as the first step for determining whether a collective waiver
of statutory forum rights in a union-negotiated arbitration agreement will be valid. However,
the Wright opinion did not address whether a proposed waiver that is "clear and unmistakable"
in form and language must also be "knowing and voluntary" in its genesis and ultimate
acceptance by the parties. A further issue to consider in a collective bargaining context, is
whether a "knowing and voluntary" standard includes the intent of only the employer and union
officials who negotiate the labor contract (i.e., the contractual parties) or, in addition, each
employee who may vote on and/or be subjected to the contract's terms and conditions (i.e., the
third-party beneficiaries). Perhaps, however, the Supreme Court, following the Eighth Circuit
in Patterson,will rule that a valid arbitration agreement in a union context requires only
adherence to the common law principles of contract law (offer, acceptance, meeting of the
minds, etc.), in addition to "clear and unmistakable" waiver language. In any event, the "clear
and unmistakable" standard in Wright appears to be only one factor, albeit a crucial factor, in
assessing the validity and enforceability of a union's collective agreement to submit individual
employment discrimination claims to an arbitral forum.
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unmistakable" fashion. 28 The Court pointed specifically to the fact that the
language of the collective bargaining agreement, as well as that of a relevant
contractual seniority plan, did not even contain a specific anti-discrimination
provision. 129 As Justice Scalia asserted: "It may well be that ordinary textual
analysis of a [collective bargaining agreement] will show that matters which
go beyond the interpretation and application of contact terms are subject to
arbitration; but they will not be presumed to be so."' 3 Thus, the arbitration
agreement in Wright could not even pass the initial litmus test for a valid
union waiver. The Court therefore found that any additional legal analysis
regarding the validity and enforceability of the clause, in light of Alexander
and Gilmer, was unnecessary.' 3 '
In essence, the Court's decision in Wright was quite narrow. It revealed
only what is legally required, at a minimum, to be included in the language of
a collective bargaining agreement that attempts to waive the individual
statutory rights of employees. However, the Court never determined whether
a waiver satisfying the "clear and unmistakable," minimum "linguistic"
standard would in fact be valid and enforceable where the statutory right to be
waived is the right to a judicial forum for ADA claims. The Court only
decided that, if all other things were equal, a waiver satisfying the "clear and
unmistakable" standard could at least survive some degree of initial
scrutiny-which in this case, the waiver could not. The basic ruling in Wright
appeared to be that, whether or not such a waiver is ultimately valid and
enforceable, the language of any such waiver must at least contain specific
indicia of intent which would likely require the parties to incorporate an
13 2
explicit reference to the statute in question.
128. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397.
129. See id. The Court recognized that, unlike the instant claim, the Austin case and the
Alexander case both involved labor contracts with specific anti-discrimination language. See
id. at 396-97.
130. Id. at 396 (emphasis in original).
131. Seeid. at397.
132. Interestingly, the Court briefly referred to, but refused to opine fully on, an argument
by Respondent and various amici that because the ADA's statutory language specifically
encourages alternative dispute resolution, an arbitration agreement such as the one at issue
should be enforced. See id. at 397 n.2. In response, the opinion stated:
Respondents and some of their amici rely upon the provision in the ADA which
states that "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including.., arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12212. They rely upon it
principally in connection with the question whether, under Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 [] (1991), a predispute agreement in a
[collective bargaining agreement] to arbitrate employment-discrimination claims is
enforceable-a question we do not reach. Our conclusion that a union waiver of
employee rights to a federal judicial forum for employment discrimination claims
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As a consequence of its narrow holding, the Court did not, and in fact
refused to, rule on whether Alexander remains good law following Gilmer.
Justice Scalia's opinion was quite clear in recognizing that the Court did not
need to "reach the question whether such a waiver would be enforceable."' 3 s
The Court explained: "[W]e find it unnecessary to resolve the question of the
validity of a union-negotiated waiver, since it is apparent to us, on the facts
and arguments presented here, that no such waiver has occurred."' 34 Thus, the
Court determined to leave for another day the question to which most eager
observers greatly anticipated an answer.
Although, admittedly, the Court's opinion did not provide the revelations
many had hoped for, it did nevertheless explore in a cursory manner the
inherent conflict between Alexander and Gilmer.' In this regard, Justice
Scalia wrote:
There is obviously some tension between these two lines of cases.
Whereas [Alexander] stated that "an employee's rights under Title VII are
not susceptible of prospective waiver," [Gilmer] held that the right to a
federal judicial forum for an ADEA claim could be waived. Petitioner and
the United States as amicus would have us reconcile the lines of authority
by maintaining that federal forum rights cannot be waived in unionnegotiated [collective bargaining agreements] even if they can be waived
in individually executed contracts-a distinction that assuredly finds support
in the text of [Gilmer]. Respondents and their amici, on the other hand,
contend that the real difference between [Alexander] and [Gilmer] is the
radical change, over two decades, in the Court's receptivity to arbitration,
leading Gilmer to affirn that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration;" [Gilmer],
they argue, has sufficiently undermined [Alexander] that a union can waive
employees' rights to ajudicial forum.' 36
Indeed, the above passage neatly framed for resolution the quandary with
which courts and practitioners have wrestled since Gilmer was decided. Yet,
as noted, the Court determined that a full reconciliation of the two cases was
not required in Wright since no legitimate waiver of forum rights had taken
must be clear and unmistakable means that, absent a clear waiver, it is not
"appropriate," within the meaning of this provision of the ADA, to find an
agreement to arbitrate. We take no position, however, on the effect of this provision
in cases where a [collective bargaining agreementjclearly encompasses employment
discrimination claims, or in areas outside collective bargaining.
Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397 n.2.
133. Id. at 397.
134. Id. at 395.
135. See Wright, 67 U.S.L.W. at 4015.
136. See id.
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place in any event.'37 Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia again verified the
troubling aspects of the conflicting cases when he explained that "whether or
not [Alexander's] seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer, [Alexander] at least stands for the
proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance
to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a [collective
bargaining agreement]."' 38 And in one final reference to the AlexanderGilmer dichotomy, the opinion also concluded that the "clear and unmistakable" standard, applicable to union waivers, would not apply where individual
employees voluntarily waived their own rights, such as occurred in Gilmer.'39
Thus, by comparing its analysis in the instant case with the facts in Gilmer,
the Court appeared to suggest implicitly that individual agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims could be enforced with broader waiver language (i.e.,
something less than "clear and unmistakable") than would be required in
analogous union agreements. Perhaps, in this comparison, the Court
foreshadowed the potential application of the pro-arbitration Gilmer analysis
to an Alexander or Wright-type case where the language of a union arbitration
clause actually comports with the heightened "clear and unmistakable"
standard.
D.

Considerations Following Wright

The Wright case clearly did not generate an instructive opinion for
determining when union agreements to arbitrate employees' statutory claims
will be enforceable. However, it did provide insight into the Court's view on
issues of legitimately waiving statutory rights, which can be part and parcel
of the individual and collective negotiation process in drafting a mutually
beneficial employment contract. One issue worth considering following the
Wright case is the options that remain if in fact the Court eventually
determines that Alexander remains good law, and a union, as a collective
entity, can never enter into a valid waiver of this kind, despite "clear and
unmistakable" language in its labor contract. Perhaps, in such a case,
employees, apart from the union, could each individually "agree to" an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. In this way, the
employees could enter into valid and enforceable individual agreements to
submit statutory claims to arbitration, and maintain their union representation
137. See id.

138. Id.
at 396.
139. See id. at 397. ("[G]ilmer involved an individual's waiver of his own rights, rather
than a union's waiver of the rights of represented employees and hence the 'clear and
unmistakable' standard was not applicable.").
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in all other respects. The case law to date suggests that this alternative is a
legal possibility but will encounter judicial resistance. 4 Although this
process would undoubtedly be construed as an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act,' 4 ' since the employer would be dealing directly
with employees regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining, a representative
union could cure the potential violation by consenting to the individual
dealings and agreements.
In support of upholding the Alexander analysis, it is not difficult to see
the potential problems associated with an employee, who would rather not
waive his or her statutory rights under a mandatory arbitration clause, but
must nevertheless vote on the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement
as a whole.'42 One might argue that, irrespective of a contract's specific
language, a court could never accurately determine whether an employee
knowingly or voluntarily approved of, or "accepted" in a common-law
contractual sense, a collective bargaining agreement containing a waiver of
certain statutory rights. Accordingly, an employee could be aware of an
arbitration clause and not agree with its terms, yet may nevertheless be bound
by its language if the collective bargaining agreement is ratified by union
officials (i.e., where rank-and-file employees are not entitled to vote on the
140. See Doyle, 158 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 1998). In Doyle, an employee individually agreed
to waive her right to a federal forum for discrimination claims although her employment was
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 1013. The Ninth Circuit found, as did
the Supreme Court in Wright, that the waiver language and the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement's arbitration clause were too broad to be fairly read as encompassing the
resolution of statutory claims. See id. at 1014-15. The court further noted that any legitimate
waiver of this kind must be a knowing waiver, which would require that the language of the
waiver and arbitration clause clearly state that an employee is foregoing the right to pursue a
statutory claim in ajudicial forum. See id. at 1015. Yet, the Ninth Circuit further implied that
had the waiver and arbitration clause been legitimate, it still would have applied the rule in
Alexander that a union could not waive this right for individual employees. See id. at 1014.
This result does not consider that the individual employee, and not the union, entered into the
waiver agreement in this case. The collective bargaining agreement only contained language
describing the scope of disputes that the arbitration clause would or would not cover.
Considering the posture of the Ninth Circuit, however, employers who seek individual
agreements from union employees should perhaps consider having employees sign a waiver and
fully detailed arbitration clause as an integrated document, despite any additional language that
may be contained in a more expansive labor agreement. As such, the individual agreement will
at least be considered a "knowing" waiver. Whether the rule in Alexander would prevent a
unionized employer from enforcing such a "knowing" waiver, notwithstanding its "individual"
character, remains untested.
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1994).
142. Depending on a particular union's constitution and by-laws, rank and file union
members may not even have the right to vote for ratification of a collective bargaining
agreement. In addition, employees who are not union members, but are otherwise part of the
relevant bargaining unit, are generally not entitled to vote on collective bargaining agreements,
yet are subject to the terms and conditions therein including the grievance-arbitration process.
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contract) or by the vote of other employees (i.e., where the employee voted not
to approve the contract but was in the minority).'43 In sum, the app!ication of
arbitration clauses in the unionized context is indeed troubling because of the
inherent democratic theory of labor organizations that can often bind
dissenting individual employees to a majority rule. However, particularly in
the case of ADA claims, an employer and union should vigorously pursue
opportunities to explain the benefits that can be realized by individual
employees where disability issues are resolved through arbitration. With such
knowledge in hand, few employees will likely disapprove of a system that
offers speed, simplicity, flexibility, confidentiality, and a chance to be heard
no matter how significant the issue may be.
As is evident, the submission of a statutory claim to binding arbitration
can arise out of an agreement either between an employer and an individual
employee or between an employer and a labor organization representing a
group of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. However,
the ADA can also influence the union/employer grievance-arbitration setting
where no specific ADA statutory claim is being brought or resolved, but
rather, where the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are at issue and
the interpretation of the contract may directly or indirectly implicate the Act's
provisions. The following section will examine the existing and potential
impact of the ADA on the manner in which arbitrators and courts interpret the
contractual language of labor agreements.
V. THE ADA AS IT APPLIES TO GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION
A.

The Application of External Law to the Collective Bargaining Agreement

Arbitrators who interpret collective bargaining agreements have
historically differed in their opinions on whether to apply external law, such
as the ADA, to the contractual grievance process.'" There are essentially
three positions that have evolved. The first school of thought is that an
arbitrator has an absolute duty to consider external law when interpreting a
labor contract, even where the agreement does not reference the particular law
at issue.' The second view is that external law should only be considered
143. See generally id.
144. See LABORAND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrpATION § 23.02, at 23-14 (Tim Bornstein et al.
eds., 1997)
145. See id. at 23-14.2 (citing Howlett, The Arbitrator,the NLRB and the Courts,20 ANN.
MEETINGNAT'LACAD. ARB. 67 (1967); Thermo King Corp., 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 612 (1993)
(Dworkin, Arb.) (reasonable accommodation-fundamental employer obligation under the

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

where an arbitrator finds a contract's language ambiguous and one of the
reasonable interpretations would violate the law.'46 The remaining position
holds that although an arbitrator's decision may allow conduct that is
otherwise unlawful, an award may not require conduct prohibited by law.147
At the Twentieth Annual Proceedings of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, two distinguished members, Bernard D. Meltzer,'48 and Robert G.
Howlett, 49 debated this very issue. 5 ' Meltzer's argument was summarized as
follows:
Bernard Meltzer argued that where there is an "irrepressible conflict"
between the collective bargaining agreement and external law, the
arbitrator should ignore the law and rely upon three points. First, that the
Supreme Court, in defining the narrow scope of the award's review,
specifically pointed out that where the arbitrator based the award solely
upon his or her view of the legislation, as opposed to the language of the
agreement, the arbitrator has exceeded the scope of his or her authority.
Second, Meltzer emphasized that parties call upon arbitrators to construe
and not to destroy their agreement. Moreover, because the Court relied
upon the specialized competence of arbitrators in contractual matters,
arbitrators would become involved in areas in which the courts had
specialized competence were the arbitrators to apply external law. Finally,
Meltzer noted that in matters of law, the courts had plenary authority and
therefore, unlike arbitrators, exercised the "coercive power of the state."
Thus, Meltzer cautioned that limited judicial review of awards applying
external law would be "wholly inappropriate."'1'
Howlett's conclusions contrasted with those of Meltzer:

Americans with Disabilities Act-has long been recognized as element of just cause by
arbitrators); cf Municipality of Anchorage, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1127 (1994) (Carr, Arb.)
(ADA actively encourages alternative dispute resolution)). See generally supra note 6
(explaining that the Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960), opined that an arbitrator is entitled to look to external
laws sources for guidance).
146. See LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION § 23.02, at 23-14.2 to 15 (Tim Bornstein
et al. eds., 1997).(citing Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, andArbitration,20 ANN.
MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 1, 15-16 (1967)).
147. See id.
at 23-15 (citing Mittenthal, The Role ofLaw in Arbitration,21 ANN. MEETING
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 42, 50 (1968)).
148. Bernard D. Meltzer was a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
149. Robert G. Howlett was the Chairperson of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board.
150. See Robert Perkovich, Does Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp. Compel the
Consideration of External Law in Labor Arbitration?:An Analysis of the Influence of the
Americans with DisabilitiesActonArbitralDecisionmaking,25 STETSONL. REv. 53, 58 (1995)
(citations omitted).
151.

Id.
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[T]he separation of contractual claims and statutory claims is "impossible
in many arbitrations." Therefore, an award that did not consider external
law might result in error, would ignore the fact that the law governs all
contracts, and would require the laws to be incorporated explicitly. As a
result, collective bargaining will be longer and more complex. [Howlett]
also argued that the public policy of the land was that parties should
resolve their disputes privately.152
According to studies, the general consensus among arbitrators is that
their role is to construe only the language of the contract and limit the scope
of their consideration to the agreement itself.'53 Yet, other sources suggest
that where arbitrators have been confronted with grievances involving Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' they have been consistent in recognizing and applying the law.'
The ADA's "reasonable accommodation"
requirement has presented arbitrators with perhaps their most significant
challenge regarding the application of external law to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. 15 6 In particular, arbitrators will inevitably encounter
difficulties in reconciling an employer's duty to provide a reasonable
accommodation where that duty conflicts with the seniority provision of a
labor contract.' 57
B.

The Clash Between Contractual Seniority Rights and the Duty to
Provide Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA.

The ADA contains specific language which prohibits participation "in a
contractual or other.., relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered
entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination
prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with
152. Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted) (alterations supplied).
153. See id. (citing George, Legislation, Discriminationand Benefits, 46 ANN. MEETING
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 130, 136 (1994), which references Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat
External Law, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 685-86 (1992)).
154. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - e(17)

(1994)).
155. See Robert Perkovich, Does Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. Compel the
Considerationof External Law in Labor Arbitration?: An Analysis of the Influence of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct on Arbitral Decisionmaking,25 STETSON L. REv. 53, 58-59
(1995) (citing George, Legislation, Discriminationand Benefits, 46 ANN. MEETING NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 130, 136 (BNA 1994), which references Willig, Arbitration of Discrimination
Grievances: Arbitral and Judicial Competence Compared,Proceedings of the 39th Annual
Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 101 (1987)).

156. See id.
157. See id.
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[a] ...labor union)."' 58 This provision has been construed as preventing an
employer from using a collective bargaining agreement as a vehicle to
circumvent the ADA's requirements either explicitly or implicitly.'59 One of
the Act's requirements that often is inextricably linked to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement is the employer's duty to provide a reasonable
accommodation to qualified applicants or employees with disabilities."6 In
this regard, a perplexing question that can arise in the grievance-arbitration
context is whether an employer breaches a seniority provision in a labor
contract by restructuring ajob or reassigning an employee to a vacant job as
a means of accommodating a disabled individual, who is otherwise not
entitled to seniority privileges. 6 ' In addition, an arbitrator may also confront
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994).
159. See LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION § 23.03[81[a], at 23-23 (Tim Bornstein
et al. eds., 1997)
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
161. Congress first applied a duty of "reasonable accommodation", in an employment
context, to the religious practices and observances of workers. This requirement was codified
in 1972 into Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994). Title
VII, in part, requires that employers reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practices
and observances up to the point of "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
Id.The Supreme Court has noted that to require an employer "to bear more than a de minimus
cost in order to [accommodate the religion of an employee] is an undue hardship." Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). Senate and House Reports concerning the ADA
explained that the "de minimus" cost rule set forth by the Supreme Court for an undue hardship
under Title VII did not apply to the duty to accommodate under the ADA. See Eckles v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1318
(1997) (citing S. REP. at 36; H.R. REP. at 68, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350).
The Supreme Court, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, considered a conflict
between a requested religious accommodation (relief from Saturday work duties) and the
collectively bargained-for seniority rights of other employees (more senior employees would
be required to work on Saturdays). See Hardison,432 U.S. at 66-69. The Court held that the
duty to accommodate could not supersede the collective seniority rights of other employees.
See id. at 79. The Court explained:
We agree that neither a collective-bargaining contract nor a seniority system may be
employed to violate the statute, but we do not believe that the duty to accommodate
requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement.
Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements
between management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy, and
seniority provisions are universally included in these contracts. Without a clear and
express indication from Congress, we cannot agree with [the plaintiff] that an
agreed-upon seniority system must give way when necessary to accommodate
religious observances.
Id. at 79 (internal footnote omitted). Since the Hardison decision, courts have differed in
applying its rationale to the ADA's duty to accommodate. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has
noted that "[tihe language of the ADA, like that of Title VII, falls far short of providing a 'clear
and express indication from Congress' that it intended 'reasonable accommodation' to include
infringing upon the seniority rights of other employees." Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94
F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1318 (1997). Conversely, the D.C.
Circuit has explained:

1999]

ARBITRATION

495

a precisely converse situation where an employer may violate the ADA by
refusing to accommodate a disabled worker with a job transfer because the
employee lacks the required seniority under a labor contract.'62 Indeed, such
scenarios can present an arbitrator with a Catch-22.
One could proffer an argument that an employee seeking such an
accommodation is not covered by the Act because he or she is not an
"otherwise qualified" individual with a disability'63 (i.e., he or she does not
have the requisite seniority under the contract to qualify for the new or
restructured job). One might also contend that such job restructuring or
reassignment is either an "unreasonable" accommodation in and of itself, or
presents an "undue hardship" for the employer."6 In this regard, since the
The ADA and its legislative history include the "clear and express indications" that
Title VII lacked, including the enumeration of "reassignment to a vacant position"
in the statutory provision regarding "reasonable accommodations," and the
statements in reports from both houses of Congress stressing that conflicts between
requested accommodations and provisions of collective bargaining agreements
(including seniority systems) are not "determinative" in the inquiry into whether the
employer must provide the accommodations.
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 896 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1997) reh 'g en banc granted
andjudgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and aff'd in part,rev 'd inpart en banc,
156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, despite the foregoing differences in legal analysis,
both the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit agree that the ADA's more stringent duty of
accommodation than that found in Title VII's protection of religion, "prevents the Supreme
Court's Title VII decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) from being
directly applicable to [an ADA] case." Id. (citing Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048).
162. Several civil rights laws, but not the ADA, allow employers to engage in what would
otherwise be discriminatory conduct ifthe employment decision at issue is based on a bona fide
seniority system. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an exception
for employers "[t]o apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (1994). Similarly, the ADEA explains that "[it shall not be unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization... to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (1994). Courts have also held that the "reasonable
accommodation" prong of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require employers to reassign
employees in contravention of a bona fide seniority system. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). The ADA protects only "qualified individuals" with
disabilities. An individual with a disability is "otherwise qualified" if the individual satisfies
the prerequisites for the position and can perform the essential functions ofajob with or without
a reasonable accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996).
164. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1996). An employer is not required to make areasonable
accommodation if doing so would impose an "undue hardship" on the employer's business
operations. One of the primary factors used in determining whether an "undue hardship" exists
is the financial status of the business. See generallyid.; supranote 67 and accompanying text.
The EEOC has suggested that an employer may invoke the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement as a means of demonstrating "that the provision of a particular
accommodation would be unduly disruptive to its other employees."
29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1996).
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accommodation may abrogate certain employees' seniority rights, it could
"unduly" subject the employer to contractual liability as well as unfair labor
practice charges for unlawfully implementing unilateral changes during the
term of a labor agreement. Notably, the EEOC interpretive guidelines explain
that a collective bargaining agreement may be considered in assessing the
extent of an employer's obligation to provide an accommodation under the
ADA, but the agreement may not be viewed as a determinative factor.' 65
As explained above, the ADA's plain language prohibits parties from
attempting to enforce contracts which are repugnant to the Act's provisions.
This mandate should provide courts with the impetus to actively scrutinize
arbitral awards that fail to incorporate the external law of the ADA, particularly where consideration of the ADA's law is crucial for a proper and legal
interpretation of a labor agreement.' 66 As one scholar notes:
Given the overriding policy behind the ADA "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities," courts undoubtedly will look
carefully at the problem of accommodating the collective bargaining
relationship to the requirements of the Act. Given the explicit provision
prohibiting the use of a labor contract as a means of discrimination
otherwise prohibited by the Act, it seems unlikely that a court routinely
would permit a seniority provision to defeat the duty to accommodate
under the ADA. Given the existence of two important competing federal
statutes and sets of policies, a more careful, case-by-case analysis is
needed. 167

165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1996). The National Labor Relations Board and the
EEOC have developed a procedure for resolving complaints and charges where the National
Labor Relations Act and the ADA are both implicated:
In November, 1993, the two agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding
intended to coordinate enforcement of both statutes through joint discussion and
participation. The memorandum provides that when the NLRB receives unfair labor
practice charges that also involve an evaluation of the parties' duties under the ADA,
the General Counsel's office will talk with the EEOC's Office of Legal Counsel
about the matter. Likewise, when the EEOC receives discrimination charges which
require an evaluation of the parties' duties under the NLRA, a similar dialogue will
take place.
Connye Y. Harper, Origin and Nature of the Duty ofFairRepresentation, 12 LAB. LAW. 183,
190-91 (1996).
166. See LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION § 23.03[8][a], at 23-24 (Tim Bornstein

et al. eds., 1997) (explaining that although labor contract provisions were given deference under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, "it is likely that the courts may take a closer look at the
relationship between collective bargaining agreements and the ADA").
167. George, Legislation, Discriminationand Benefits, 46 ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. 130, 140 (BNA 1994) (footnotes omitted). See generallyEric H. J. Stahlhut, Playingthe
Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate Under the ADA by
Claiminga Collective BargainingObligation?,9 LAB. LAW. 71(1993).
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Arbitrators, who consider disability issues either directly or indirectly,
have a substantial amount of case law at their disposal addressing the problem
of how to reconcile the ADA's "duty to accommodate" with conflicting terms
contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Yet, the legal conclusions of
a majority of these decisions may not be convincingly sound, and the rationale
of the various cases reflects at least some difference in opinion within the
court system.
C.

Case Law

Several federal circuit courts have examined the issue of whether the
terms of a collectively-bargained seniority system can limit the duty of an
employer to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Most
courts, to this point, have concluded that employers are not required to
accommodate an employee with a disability if to do so would violate a
contractual seniority provision of a labor contract. 6 In fact, an accommodation having this effect has been almost uniformly considered per se unreasonable. The federal courts of appeals that have supported this view include the
Seventh Circuit, in Eckles v. ConsolidatedRail Corp., 69 the Third Circuit, in
Kralikv. Durbin,70 the Fifth Circuit, in Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,171
the Sixth Circuit, in the unpublished decision of Boback v. GeneralMotors
168. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996). The issue
presented in Eckles was: "whether the ADA requires as 'reasonable accommodation' that a
disabled individual be given special job placement ... in violation of a bona fide seniority
system in place under a collectively bargained agreement, when such accommodation is the only
way of meeting the job restrictions of that disabled individual." Id.at 1045-46. The Eckles
court held that the ADA does not require that the plaintiff be placed in a different job to
accommodate his disability where the reassignment would violate the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. See id. at 1052. In addition, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that its
holding was limited to "individual seniority rights and should not be interpreted as a general
finding that all provisions found in collective bargaining agreements are immune from limitation
by the ADA duty to reasonably accommodate." Id.at 1052-53.
169. 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) "After examining the text, background, and
legislative history of the ADA duty of'reasonable accommodation,' we conclude that the ADA
does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively
bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.... Congress did not intend that other
employees lose their positions in order to accommodate a disabled coworker." Id.at 1047.; see
also Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the
ADA does not entitle a disabled employee to "superseniority," and that the employer is not
required to reassign an employee with a disability where doing so would violate terms of a
collective bargaining agreement).
170. 130 F.3d 76,82 (3d Cir. 1997) (following Eckles).
171. 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he ADA does not require an employer to take
action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining
agreement.").
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Corp.,'72 the Eighth Circuit, in Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., ' the Ninth
Circuit, in Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass 'n,'74 and the Tenth Circuit, in
Aldrich v. Boeing Co.'7' The conclusions of these courts are arguably
supported by analogous precedent under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, '76
172. 107 F.3d 870 (Table), No. 95-3836, 1997 WL 3613, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 1997)
(unpublished disposition) (stating, in dicta, that "the ADA does not require an employer to
violate the contractual rights of other workers in an effort to accommodate a single employee."
Dicta from another Sixth Circuit opinion also supports the adoption of the majority rule. See
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[A] reassignment will not
require.., violating another employee's rights under a collective bargaining agreement."
173. 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The ADA does not require that [the employer]
take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective
bargaining agreement."); see also Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382,386 (8th Cir. 1995)
("An employer is not required [under the ADA] to make accommodations that would violate
the rights of other employees."
174. 162 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "an employee's proposed
accommodation under the ADA is [per se] unreasonable if it conflicts with a bona fide seniority
system established under a CBA.").
175. 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the ADA does not require
an employer to transfer a disabled employee as an accommodation if to do so would violate the
seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement).
176. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in various sections of
chapter 29 of the United States Code). "In applying the Rehabilitation Act's reasonable
accommodation requirements, the courts have given deference to collective bargaining
agreements.... [and] have held that it would be a breach of a labor contract if the employer
restructured ajob or made ajob assignment in violation of contractual seniority provisions."
LABORAND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

§ 23.03[7], at 23-22 (Tim Bornstein et al. eds., 1997).

See Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Consequently, we... conclude that the
postal service was not required to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different
position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective
bargaining agreement."); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Reassigning
[employee] to permanent light duty, when he was not entitled to one of a limited number of light
duty positions, might have interfered with the rights of other employees under the collective
bargaining agreement."); see also Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.
1985); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984); Hurst v. United
States Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1986). But see Ignacio v. United States Postal
Serv., 30 M.S.P.R. 471, 475 (Spec. Pan. 1986) (explaining that Rehabilitation Act takes
precedence over any contrary terms in the collective bargaining agreement)).
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 served as the principal
federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination against persons with disabilities. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1994). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits the federal
government, federal contractors, and entities that receive federal funding from discriminating
against handicapped persons. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994) (federal government); 29 U.S.C. §
793 (1994) (federal contractors); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (entities receiving federal funds). The
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are statutorily integrated laws because the agencies that
enforce employment discrimination claims under the ADA and under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 are responsible for developing procedures so that administrative complaints filed under
both Acts are handled in a way that "avoids duplication of effort and prevents imposition of
inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same requirements." 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994) (explaining that Congress intended for courts to interpret
the ADA by considering precedent established by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Ennis v.
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legislative history tending to show that "bumping" was meant to be excluded
from the scope of reasonable accommodation, and precedent under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;'" all of which may imply that the duty to
accommodate does not require the breach of a collective bargaining agreement."' Specifically, the Seventh Circuit, in the leading case of Eckles v.
ConsolidatedRail Corp., explained that "the ADA does not require disabled
individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained,
bona fide seniority rights of other employees."' 7 9 The Eckles court adopted
a strict rule that "individual seniority rights... are immune from limitation
by the ADA's duty to reasonably accommodate." 0 The court further clarified
its ruling by asserting that "collectively bargained seniority rights have a preexisting special status in the law and that Congress to date has shown no intent
to alter this status by the duties created under the ADA."''
However, in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,"2 a District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision that was vacated and reheard en
banc, 3 a three-judge panel of the court sharply disagreed with the Seventh
National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1995) ("To the extent
possible, we adjudicate ADA claims in a manner consistent with decisions interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act.").
177. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2000e(17) (1994)).
178. See generally Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997) (citing Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977)); see also LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION § 23.03[8][a], at 23-25 (Tim
Bornstein et al. eds., 1997).
179. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051.
180. Id.at 1052.
181. Id.
182. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997) reh 'g en bancgrantedandjudgmentvacated, 124 F.3d
1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and aff'd inpart,rev 'dinparten banc, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
183. The D.C. Circuit's vacated panel decision, although lacking in preceden.tial value,
remains important because of its thorough analysis and marked divergence from the majority
rule on this issue. However, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that the district court
had misconstrued some of the facts in the case; and thus the court's consideration of a conflict
between seniority rights and the ADA was premature, and perhaps unnecessary. See Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The court noted that
the language of the collective bargaining agreement's seniority provision and the law of the
ADA were not necessarily in conflict in this instance. See id. The D.C. Circuit found that the
trial court failed to consider whether the collective bargaining agreement's handicapped-transfer
provision may have in fact provided the defendant with the means of reassigning the plaintiff
without invoking the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirements. See id. at 1306. The
court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reanalyze the facts
under a specific paradigm. See id. at 1306. The D.C. Circuit explained:
[T]he district court was incorrect in perceiving a conflict under all circumstances
between the terms of the CBA and the ADA, and so need not have reached the issue
of what would occur in the event of such a conflict. We thus reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment to [the defendant] on this issue. On remand, the
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Circuit's analysis in Eckles."' TheAka court rejected the per se rule of Eckles
regarding the superiority of seniority rights, and imposed a more general
affirmative duty upon the employer to attempt to diligently comply with the
ADA's duty to accommodate, notwithstanding conflicting language in a
collective bargaining agreement." 5 The Aka decision instituted a balancing
district court should determine, through summary judgment or trial, whether on the
facts of this case [the defendant] had an obligation under the ADA to reassign [the
plaintiff] to a vacant position. This entails deciding, among other questions, whether
a vacant position for which [the plaintiff] was qualified was available, and whether
reassigning [the plaintiff] would have been an undue hardship. If [the defendant]
was obliged to reassign [the plaintiff], the district court should then decide whether
the [reassignment provision for handicapped employees in the collective bargaining
agreement] permitted [the defendant] to perform this reassignment. Only if the
district court concludes that [the defendant] did not have the power to reassign [the
plaintiff] under [language of the collective bargaining agreement] but that the ADA
required [the defendant] to reassign him will the ADA and the CBA be in conflict.
Given the large number of contingencies that could preclude such a conflict, we see
no need to address whether, if such a conflict arose, the CBA or the ADA would
give way in the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 1305-06. Although the en banc court passed on an opportunity to resolve the potential
conflict between the duty to accommodate under the ADA and contractual seniority rights, the
court did offer some insight into the importance of fully recognizing the ADA's mandates. The
court indicated that, "collective bargaining agreements are interpreted wherever possible so as
to be consistent with federal labor law." Id. at 1303 (citing International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476,
1480 (6th Cir. 1983)). "Thus, an interpretation of [the instant collective bargaining agreement's
provisions] which allows [the defendant] to implement its ADA obligations is distinctly
preferred." Id. at 1304. The court further remarked: "Indeed, Congress expressly suggested
that, as a way of avoiding conflicts between [collective bargaining agreements] and the ADA,
collective bargaining agreements incorporate provisions 'permitting the employer to take all
actions necessary to comply with this legislation." Id. at 1304 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(11),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 346). Apparently, the
D.C. Circuit, for one, is prepared to view the ADA as a statutory scheme that is not to be
diluted, if at all possible, by other rights and obligations associated with a collective bargaining
agreement.
184. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 895-96. The D.C. Circuit's disagreement with the Eckles court,
and its unique analysis of the conflict between the duty to accommodate and seniority rights has
been the topic of much scholarly debate as of late. See, e.g., Estella J. Schoen, Note, Does the
ADA Make Exceptions in a Unionized Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment
Provision of the ADA and Collectively BargainedSeniority Systems, 82 MiNN. L. REv. 1391
(1998); Belinda Spaeth, Comment, Aka v. Washington Hospital Center and Kralick v. Durbin:
Is it "Reasonable" to Require an Employer to Accommodate an ADA PlaintiffWhen Doing So
Violates the Collectively BargainedSeniority Rights ofOther Employees?, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J.
989 (1998).
185. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 896. The Aka court rejected much of the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Eckles, and held that an employer is required to provide a reasonable
accommodation unless it would be unreasonable or impose an undue hardship. See id. at 89597. The court explained that the existence of a conflict between the contractual language of a
collective bargaining agreement and the duty to reasonably accommodate under the ADA is
"relevant only insofar as it undermines the employee's claim that the requested accommodation
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approach where "conflicts between accommodations to disabled employees
and the terms of applicable bargaining agreements exist on a continuum,
rather than functioning like an on/off switch." '86 Aka asserted that, under a
faithful reading of the plain language of the ADA, an employer is required to
is 'reasonable' or bolsters the employer's affirmative defense that the accommodation could not
be provided without 'undue hardship'." Id. at 894. The Aka court further stated: "[C]onflicts
between accommodations to disabled employees and the terms of applicable collective
bargaining agreements exist on a continuum, rather than functioning like an 'on/off' switch."
Id. at 896 (citation omitted). The court suggested that among the relevant factors to be
considered in assessing this continuum is the nature of the seniority rights upon which the
employee's accommodation has infringed. See id at 896-97. Where, as in the Aka case, the
collective bargaining agreement contains language that arguably authorizes an employer to
comply with the ADA and accommodate disabled employees, the infringement is considered
minimal. See id. Although the Aka court did not opine on the issue, presumably where no such
enabling language is present in a collective bargaining agreement, the employer's duty to
accommodate would be more tenuous in the face of conflicting contractual and statutory
mandates.
186. Id. at 896; see also Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. 875 F. Supp. 393,396-97 (E.D.
Tex. 1995) ("[W]hen reassignment of an otherwise qualified employee would conflict with an
otherwise valid collective bargaining agreement or seniority system, this conflict shall be
weighed by the fact finder in evaluating the reasonableness of such an accommodation under
the ADA.").
The Ninth Circuit, in Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 162 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1998),
cited one commentator who had suggested a model balancing approach that would include a
consideration of the following factors:
1)
the difference between the amount of seniority required for the position and
the amount of seniority acquired by the disabled employee;
2)
the number of employees over whom the disabled employee would pass for
the position;
3)
the frequency with which the position becomes available;
4)
the presence or absence of senior employees who would voluntarily surrender
their eligibility to the position in order to accommodate the disabled coworker;
5)
the prospects possessed by the disabled employee for securing alternate
employment both within and without the organization.
Id. at 567-68 (citing William J. McDevitt, SenioritySystems andtheAmericans with Disabilities
Act: The Fate of "ReasonableAccommodation" After Ecldes, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 359, 384
(1997)). However, the Willis court proceeded to adopt the per se rule of Eckles and predicted
that such a balancing approach would be unreliable in practice. The Ninth Circuit explained:
We believe that the balancing approach would leave employers too vulnerable to the
possibility of guessing wrong when trying to weigh the relative benefits and burdens
on disabled and non-disabled employees. The consequences of guessing wrong are
especially burdensome in the context of a collectively bargained seniority system,
where the employer and/or union might be subjected to grievances or lawsuits filed
by workers who were "bumped," and employers would be vulnerable to charges of
unfair labor practices under the NLRA. We are persuaded that it would be improper
to subject an employer to the Hobson's choice of violating the ADA or the NLRA,
or at least subjecting itself to the threat of litigation under these statutes, depending
on the outcome of the "balancing" approach.
Id. at 568.
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*provide an accommodation unless to do so would be "unreasonable" or would
impose an "undue hardship."' 7 The District of Columbia Circuit suggested
that the text of the ADA, its legislative history, "and the relevant EEOC
regulations clearly indicate that the fact that a particular accommodation
would require some departure from the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement should not in itself determine the question of whether an employer
may be required to provide the accommodation."' 88 Rather, the analysis
should operate on a sliding scale and measure "the degree of infringement
imposed by a 'reasonable accommodation' . . . on a 'right' held by other
employees under the collective bargaining agreement."' 89 Under this
rationale, a court or an arbitrator could more accurately carry out the ADA's
directive of determining whether, based on all of the circumstances, the
proposed accommodation would "impose an 'undue hardship' or would be
'unreasonable"' for the employer.'9
In support of the Aka rationale, Third Circuit Judge Mansmann, in the
dissenting opinion in Kralik v. Durbin,'9 ' noted:
Although I recognize that the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit in Aka v. Washington Hospital, lacks precedential value, I
find its analysis and rejection of Eckles sound and adopt its reasoning as
the essence of my disagreement with the majority. ...
The approach adopted by the majority in reliance on Eckles could
well lead to absurd results which run counter to the broad remedial
purposes of the ADA. The better approach would be to jettison the per se
rule developed in the context of the far less sweeping Rehabilitation Act
in favor of the balancing process already in place under the ADA in the
determination of "undue hardship." The result reached in Eckles under the
undue hardship balancing analysis would likely be unchanged where in this
case, the outcome would be far less certain.' 93
Judge Manssman also indicated that the "academic response to the decision
in Eckles has been less than enthusiastic."' 94 In particular, Manssman noted
187. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 895-96.
188. Id.at 896.
189. Id.
190. Id.at 895.
191. 130 F.3d 76, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1997) (Manssman, J., dissenting).
192. Id.at 87 (citation omitted).
193. Id.at 88 (footnotes omitted).
at 88 n.b. (citing William J. McDevitt, Seniority Systems and the Americans
194. See id.
with DisabilitiesAct: The Fate of "ReasonableAccommodation" After Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 359 (1997); Condon A. McGlothlen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. ConsolidatedRail
Corp.: Reconciling the ADA with Collective BargainingAgreements: Is This the Correct
Approach?, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 1043 (1997)).
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that to hold "a requested accommodation ... per se unreasonable where it
conflicts with the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement"
ignores the practical and complex tension between the ADA and other labor
195
relations statutes, specifically the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Accordingly, Judge Manssman referenced one scholar's observation:
While the ADA fosters equal employment opportunities for all Americans
without regard to disability, its drafters ignored a very serious problem.
The ADA, while promoting the rights of individual Americans in the
workplace, conflicts dramatically with the [NLRA], an act designed to
promote collective rights in the workplace. The ADA, the regulations, and
the Interpretive Guidance all fail to address the issue of how to reasonably
accommodate an individual with a disability under the ADA in a unionized
setting-where such rights are typically received as part of a collective
bargaining agreement. As a result of this oversight, conflicts between the
NLRA and the ADA have arisen. 196
Notably, the EEOC's position on this matter echoes the sentiment of the
Aka court and Judge Manssman. In fact, the EEOC set forth its rationale in
an amicus brief filed for the plaintiff, Terry Eckles, in the Seventh Circuit case
of Eckles v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.97 The brief acknowledged that "the
ADA does not require displacement or 'bumping' of another employee to
accommodate a disabled individual." However the EEOC further explained
that, when an employer and union are faced with conflicting duties arising out
of the ADA and a labor contract, they have a duty "to negotiate in good faith
a variance from collectively bargained seniority rules when the only available
effective accommodation contravenes these rules and
the proposed accommo198
employees."'
other
burden
unduly
not
will
dation
The Aka majority opinion, the dissent in Kralik,and the EEOC' s position
demonstrate that the resolution of the problem of applying the external
"accommodation" law of the ADA to the collective bargaining agreement
context, and to grievance arbitration itself, is not a straightforward issue.
Interestingly, only three of the courts above, [the Seventh Circuit, in Eckles,
the Third Circuit, in Kralik, and the Ninth Circuit, in Willis], even considered
the fact that the ADA actually contains an outright prohibition against
participating "in a contractual or other.., relationship that has the effect of
subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability
195. See id. at 84-85.
196. Id. at 85 (quoting Robert W. Pritchard, Avoiding the Inevitable: Resolving the
Conflicts Between the ADA and the NLRA, 11 LAB. LAW. 375 (1995)).
197. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997).
198. Id. at 1051.
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Of further note is the fact

199. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994); see also Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046; Kralik, 130
F.3d at 80; Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 162 F.3d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1998). The Eckles
opinion, in discussing this issue, stated:
The ADA likewise prohibits "discrimination defined as "participating in a
contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a
covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the
discrimination prohibited under this subchapter.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2).
Eckles maintains that the defendants also violated this provision. We find, however,
that in the circumstances of this case, establishing a violation of section 12112(b)(2)
depends upon establishing a violation of section 12112(b)(5)(A), since the only form
of discrimination actually alleged is a failure to provide reasonable accommodation.
If "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA does not require reassignment to a
position held by another employee, the collective bargaining agreement at issue did
not subject Eckles to prohibited discrimination by establishing a bona fide seniority
system that regulated the holding of positions at Conrail. It is true that covered
entities cannot avoid their ADA duties by contractual manipulation: "An employer
cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to accomplish what it would be
prohibited from doing under [the ADA]." Yet Eckles does not claim that the
seniority system was established, even in part, in order to bypass the duty to
accommodate under the ADA; and there is no evidence of such a subterfuge.
Consequently, if the ADA does not require that collectively bargained seniority
rights be compromised in order to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual,
Eckles cannot establish that Conrail and the union are guilty of participating in a
contractual arrangement that has the effect of subjecting him to prohibited
discrimination. Hence the issue is simply what is required by "reasonable
accommodation."
See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046 (citing S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989); H.R.
REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345)
(internal footnote omitted). In commenting on relevant legislative history, the Eckles court also
observed:
The House Report on the ADA explicitly recognizes that the contractual
discrimination provision does not expand the duties imposed by the ADA. Looking
at the text of section 12112(b)(2), the House Report concludes:
The basic intent of this provision is that any entity may not do through a
contractual provision what it may not do directly. The type of discrimination
prohibited is that 'prohibited by this title' -i.e., that set forth in the substantive
provisions of the bill.... The contractual relationship adds no new obligations in
and of itself beyond the obligations imposed by the Act, nor does it reduce the
obligations imposed by the Act.
Id.at 1046 n.10 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 342). The Third Circuit's majority opinion in Kralik adopted the
above language and rationale from Eckles when discussing the obligations under 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(2) in its opinion. See Kralik, 130 F.3d at 81-83.
The Ninth Circuit responded to an argument by the plaintiffs, which cited this provision
of the ADA, by stating that "the operation of a bona fide seniority system is not discriminatory
simply because it does not allow for accommodations which would upset the operation of the
seniority system itself." See Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 162 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir.
1998). This reasoning appears to be somewhat circular since the court is taking the position that
the source of the alleged discrimination (i.e., the contractual seniority system) is, in fact, also
the basis for a finding of non-discrimination (i.e., an accommodation that violates the seniority
system is unreasonable and thus not required under the ADA).
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that this prohibition does not have a counterpart in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, yet many of the circuit courts that have allowed seniority provisions to
"trump" the ADA's "accommodation" law, use cases decided under the
Rehabilitation Act to support their holdings. 2" Moreover, the rationale for
relying on cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to resolve this
issue suffers from an additional significant flaw. As the Aka court pointed
out:
With regard to the cases construing the Rehabilitation Act, we note that
although this Act is quite similar to the ADA in most respects, . . .the two
acts diverge sharply on this particular question, because the ADA explicitly
suggests "reassignment to a vacant position" as a form of "reasonable
accommodation" that may be required of employers.2"'
Thus, although Congress intended that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 be construed as statutorily integrated laws, it is questionable and perhaps
error to place great reliance on judicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 when analyzing this particular issue under the ADA.
D.

Additional Applications of the ADA

The foregoing conflict in decisional law involves the relatively narrow
issue of whether the law of the ADA can require job restructuring (i.e.,
transfer, reassignment, reclassification, promotion, etc.) for a disabled worker
to accommodate his or her disability even though that employee does not
enjoy the contractual seniority privileges necessary for such restructuring.
Yet, other provisions of the Act may also influence the rights and obligations
of employees and employers under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. Potential scenarios include, but are clearly not limited to: Whether
an employer may discharge or discipline employees with mental
200. See Kralik, 130 F.3d at 82 ("[T]he Eckles court explained that Congress adopted the
ADA against 'the backdrop of well established precedent that reasonable accommodation under
the Rehabilitation Act had never been held to require trumping the seniority rights of other
employees."') (citing Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eckles
court noted:
[C]ourts have been unanimous in rejecting the claim that "reasonable
accommodation" under the Rehabilitation Act requires reassignment of a disabled
employee in violation of a bona fide seniority system. In fact, a virtual per se rule
has emerged that such reassignment is not required under the Rehabilitation Act's
duty to reasonably accommodate.
Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047.
201. Aka, 116 F.3d 876, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted andjudgment
vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(1994)), and opinion
reinstatedin parton reh 'g en banc, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

impairments; 20 2 whether discharge is appropriate when an employee's
disability can be adequately controlled by medication;2 3 whether an employer
may discharge or discipline a worker due to excessive absenteeism; 2° whether
an employer must provide medical leave as an accommodation for an
employee's disabling condition; 20 1 whether an employer may discharge an
employee with HIV or AIDS; 21 whether an employer may discipline or
discharge employees with alcohol or drug addictions; 2 7 whether an employer
202. See LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION § 23.03[9][b], at 23-31 (Tim Bornstein
et al. eds., 1997) (citing American Smelting & Ref. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 722 (1972)
(Rentfro, Arb.)). Although the case was outside the context of the ADA, Arbitrator Rentfro, in
American Smelting & Ref Co., observed:
Arbitrators are reluctant to uphold a discharge for such [emotional] disability
unless the employer has shown that not only can the disabled employee no longer
perform his own job adequately, but that there is no other job available that he can
do.... [T]here is a degree of callousness involved in turning out a senior employee
because of disabilities [physical or emotional] if he is capable of doing a less
demanding job satisfactorily.
American Smelting & Ref Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 725.
203. See LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 23.04[2], at 23-34 (citing Mobil Oil
Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1090 (1983) (Taylor, Arb.); Mead Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1000
(1983) (Heinsz, Arb.); Barth Smelting & Ref Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 374 (1964) (Berkowitz,
Arb.) (standing for the proposition that dismissal in this situation is considered inappropriate,
and although these cases were decided before the enactment of the ADA, the rule established
therein is even more likely to prevail today if such employees are able to perform the essential
functions of their jobs with the reasonable accommodation of medication) (See supra note
129)).
204. See id. § 23.04[4], at 23-38 ("[An employer's duty of reasonable accommodation
under the ADA may include the duty to tolerate additional absences by individuals with a
disability in order to accommodate their disability.") (citing, for example, Kimbro v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990) (discharge of
employee for poor attendance as consequence of cluster migraines violated Washington state
statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap)); see also PacificBell, 91 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 653 (1988) (Kaufman, Arb.) (reinstating diabetic employee who was terminated for
excessive absenteeism because employer failed to ascertain whether employee's condition had
been sufficiently controlled by medication and that her attendance was likely to improve).
205. See id. § 23.06, at 23-45. "A leave of absence to obtain medical treatment is a
reasonable accommodation if it is likely that, following the treatment, the employee will be able
safely to perform his or her duties." Id. (citing Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991 (D.
Or. 1994)).
206. See id. § 23.08, at 23-49 & n.3 (noting that under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, an employer may discriminate against an employee with HIV or AIDS if that person
poses a "significant risk to the health and safety of others") (citing Scoles v. Mercy Health
Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (construing ADA case where surgeon was infected
with HIV)).
207. Seeid. §23.10, at 23-57 to 58.
An alcoholic is a disabled individual under the ADA if the alcoholic, with a
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job.
However, employees "currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs" are excluded
from the protection of the ADA. The ADA permits an employer to hold any
employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same
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must accommodate an employee's learning disability;2. 8 or even whether an
employer can require an employee to submit to a medical examination. 20 9 As
is evident, the interplay between the ADA and a collective bargaining
agreement regarding matters beyond the scope of seniority rights, such as
discipline, discharge, and even employee assistance programs, can run wide
and deep. Thus, although some arbitrators may take the position that they are
only required to consider the external law of the ADA if the collective
bargaining agreement contains provisions to that effect,210 others might argue
qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior to which
other employees are held, even if the unsatisfactory performance or behavior is
caused by the drug use or alcoholism of the employee....
Under the ADA, an employer may be required to provide a leave of absence
to an employee with an alcohol problem, particularly if the employer would provide
that accommodation to an employee with some other illness requiring medical
treatment.
Employers may discharge persons who are currently engaged in the illegal use
of drugs on the basis of such use.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12114(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§
1630.3, 1630.16(b)(4) (1996); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994); Mead
Prods., St. Joseph Div., 96 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240 (1991) (Fowler, Arb.) (discharge for off-duty
drinking incident reduced to suspension); cf. Thermo King Corp., 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 612
(1993) (Dworkin, Arb.) (ADA does not require employers to make reasonable accommodations
for users of illegal drugs) with Oshe Foods,Inc., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 814 (1903) (Eisler, Arb.)
(employee who tested positive for marijuana improperly discharged where collective bargaining
agreement provided "conditional employment" program)); see also Gulf Coast Indus. Workers
Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 441
(1993) (holding arbitrator violated public policy and exceeded his authority in ordering the
reinstatement of an employee who tested positive for cocaine and using the ADA to support the
decision through the assertion: "By placing drug users outside the ADA's protective ambit,
Congress explicitly refused to open employment doors..." for drug users.).
208. See LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 23.09[5], at 23-55 (Tim Bornstein et
al. eds., 1997) (explaining that "[an employer has a duty to accommodate an employee's
learning disability.") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 100 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 393 (1993) (Pelofsky, Arb.) (holding that employer had improperly discharged a
learning disabled worker at a nuclear power plant for failing to pass a hazardous materials
handling course and ruling that where an employer is cognizant of a learning disability, it has
a duty to reasonably tailor its instructions to that particular disability)).
209. See id. § 23.11, at 23-58 to 60 (explaining the ADA's various restrictions on subjecting
employees to medical examinations).
210. See id. ("Whether an employer has a duty of accommodation in such situations may
turn on the inclusion of an accommodation provision in the labor agreement."). For a recent
discussion as to why the ADA should not be considered by an arbitrator where the Act has not
been explicitly incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement, see Shell Oil Co, Inc., 109
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 965, 968-69 (1998) (Baroni, Arb.). Arbitrator Barry J. Baroni explained:
Courts, such as the eleventh circuit in Brisentine, have stated that statutory and
contractual claims have legally independent origins and are equally available to the
aggrieved party, and, it is not enough that the arbitrator can resolve contract claims
in a case in which factual issues arising from the contract claims overlap with the
statutory claims.... In summary, the ADA is not a part of the subject Agreement.
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that an arbitrator always has an affirmative duty to ensure that an employer
and a union are not permitted to enforce a contract that violates the ADA.
Indeed, arbitrators perhaps should be legally obligated to recognize the
ADA's prohibition against employers and labor organizations entering into
contracts that could potentially run afoul of the Act. Regardless of whether
the contract specifically includes provisions concerning accommodation or
discrimination on the basis of disability, arbitrators should not "be comfortable rendering a decision which results in a clear violation of the ADA. ' 21'
... Moreover, the Agreement does not even make reference to the application of
external law.... Absent such language, this arbitrator has no authority to exercise
jurisdiction over Grievant's ADA claim, and is therefore confined to review and
decide issues that are allegedly in violation of specific provisions of the subject
Agreement.
Id. (citations omitted). Compare the foregoing absolutist view with the more indeterminate
explanation from Arbitrator James E. Giblin in Champion Int'l Corp., 109 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
753, 759-60 (1997) (Giblin, Arb.) (explaining the relevant positions but deciding that the issue
did not have to be resolved in the instant case):
The Company contends that this Arbitrator has no authority to address the rights of
the Grievant under the ADA because the Arbitrator's authority is strictly limited to
the interpretation and application of the contract. Such issue requires a decision as
to whether the labor contract authorizes the Arbitrator to incorporate the law to
abrogate a provision in the contract. Such question involves a profound difference
of opinion among labor relations authorities.
One school of thought maintains the principal [sic] that the parties to a labor
contract cannot be presumed to intend that any of its provisions shall be contrary to
law. Therefore, it follows that the law is incorporated therein by reference. By
further inference, the arbitrable forum is the proper place to adjudicate the legal
issue.
The contrary school of thought holds to the principal [sic] that, where the
contract is silent as to specific arbitrable authority in this area, the Arbitrator has no
jurisdiction to address legal issues. The Arbitrator's authority is strictly limited to
the interpretation of the contract.
Champion Int'l Corp., 109 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 760.
211. LABORAND EMPLOYMENTARBITRATION § 23.03[8][a], at 23-26 n.51 (Tim Bornstein
et al. eds., 1997) (citing George, Legislation, Discriminationand Benefits, 46 ANN. MEETING
NAT'LACAD. ARB.130, 141 (1994)). Professor George recommended the following situations
in regard to how an arbitrator should analyze the duty to accommodate in reference to
conflicting collective bargaining agreement language:
If the labor contract contains no prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
disability, the arbitrator may rely on the traditional role of interpreting only the
agreement.
If the labor contract prohibits the proposed accommodations (such as a
seniority requirement for transfer to a light duty position) and also prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability, the arbitrator may have to resolve the
conflict. (In interpreting the discrimination prohibition, the arbitrator would turn to
the ADA for guidance.)
If several accommodations are possible and at least one alternative does not
violate the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator may hold true to the
contract and at the same time condemn the employer's refusal to implement a
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Cases heard by arbitrators regarding the issue of conflicts between accommodations and seniority rights have yielded contrasting results." 2 Yet, arguably,
the firmness and finality of any arbitration decision that fails to incorporate
fully the ADA's mandates in this context could be successfully challenged and
vacated under a theory of contrariness and repugnance to the explicit public
policy espoused by the ADA2 13 and/or a manifest disregard of the law.214
reasonable accommodation consistent with the contract.
Id. at 23-26 to 23-26.1.
212. See, e.g., Clark County Sheriffs Dep 't, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 193 (1994) (Kindig,
Arb.) (declining to consider the impact of the ADA on the employer's duty to accommodate
where the proposed accommodation was clearly inconsistent with the collective bargaining
agreement); accordAlcoa Bldg. Prods., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 364 (1995) (Cerone, Arb.). But
see City of DearbornHeights, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 809 (1993) (Kanner, Arb.) (holding that
an employer's duty to comply with the collective bargaining agreement in providing a
reasonable accommodation was not absolute, and rather, was to be weighed in assessing the
reasonableness of the employer's decision).
213. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)
(explaining that arbitration awards may be set aside if they are contrary to "some explicit public
policy" that is "well defined and dominant" and ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal
precedents•.."). The Supreme Court, in Misco, noted that "federal courts are empowered to
set aside arbitration awards" based on the FAA'sjudicial review provisions. See id. at 40. The
Misco Court also noted:
The Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of. . . workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' . .. but the federal courts have often
looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of
the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act... empowers the
federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern'[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization' under the federal labor
laws.
Id. at 40 n.9 (alterations added) (citations omitted).
In this regard, the FAA recognizes several limited grounds upon which arbitration awards
may be vacated:
(1)
Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2)
Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(3)
Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4)
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994). Under the FAA, arbitration awards may also be modified or corrected
by a federal district court:
(a)
Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred
to in the award.
(b)
Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted.
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
What is clear from the discussion above is that a grievance which
implicates a disability issue can quickly evolve into an hotly-contested, ADA
court claim if the employee does not obtain satisfactory relief from the
internal grievance procedure. Under this premise, an arbitrator who skillfully
and deliberately addresses disability issues where they arise, and who
specifically recognizes the ADA in his or her decision, may prevent the
grievant from suing the employer. In such a case, the judicial system and the
potential adversaries could both prevail in their own ways. Conversely, if
grievance arbitrators choose not to consider the ADA when it is clearly
implicated, the result may be a greater propensity on the part of an aggrieved
employee to use the same facts and circumstances surrounding the grievance
to pursue an individual ADA claim. An employee who is dissatisfied with the
grievance process or who harbors hostility toward an employer even after
bringing a successful grievance may pursue a claim out of frustration, revenge,
or simply in order to have his or her ",day in court" on the ADA issue.
In an effort to minimize potential ADA claims, where appropriate,
arbitrators should participate actively in incorporating the ADA into their
decisions. To accommodate arbitrators in this task, employers and labor
organizations should recognize their responsibilities to draft collective
bargaining agreements that specifically provide for consideration of the
(c)

Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994). A district court's order in this regard "may modify and correct the award,
so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties." See id. See supra
note 102 for an explanation of how courts have ruled with respect to whether the FAA applies
to collective bargaining agreements.
214. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruledon other grounds in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (indicating that arbitration awards can
be vacated if they are in "manifest disregard of the law")); see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Security
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that although the Supreme Court
has not defined the term "manifest disregard of the law," such a standard should be "sufficiently
rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law"); Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that to set aside an award for
manifest disregard for the law, a challenger is required to demonstrate the award is "(1)
unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group
ofjudges, ever could conceivably have made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial
assumption that is concededly a non-fact."); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that an award is in manifest disregard of the
law if"(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate;
and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle"); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v.
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that an award is in manifest disregard
of the law if the arbitrator deliberately disregards what he or she knows to be the law).
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external law of the ADA in resolving grievances." 5 In this way, arbitrators
would no longer have to confront the jurisdictional issue of "arbitrability or,
in other words, whether they have been empowered by the parties to apply
statutory law. Until a time when all agreements contain such language,
however, arbitrators should recognize that the ADA sets forth clear prohibitions against entering into labor contracts that result in violations of the Act's
provisions. And any decision contrary to the Act's requirements and policy
underpinnings is subject to being vacated even upon the somewhat limited
judicial review of arbitral awards. Compelling grievants to go to court to
enforce their rights because arbitrators choose not to consider the implications
of the ADA defeats many of the major economic benefits of the arbitral
process. ADA cases may end up being heard in at least two forums instead of
one, and the resources of the federal judiciary will be needlessly consumed
where an arbitrator may have had an opportunity to resolve the relevant
disability issues in the first instance.2 16
Apart from the grievance arbitration context, however, case law dictates
that arbitrators should not hesitate to adjudicate statutory claims under the
ADA where such a forum selection arises out of voluntary individual
arbitration agreements. Nevertheless, many observers insist that arbitrators
must be well-trained in order to substitute adequately for a judge and jury in
such cases. As one court has asserted: "[A]rbitrators must step up to the
challenges presented by the resolution of statutory issues and must be vigilant
to protect the important rights embodied in the laws entrusted to their care."2 7
215. In Aka, 116 F.3d 876, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1997) reh'g en banc granted and judgment
vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and aff'd in part,vacated in part, rev 'd in parten
banc, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit explained that "Congress hoped that
post-ADA collective bargaining agreements would include provisions enabling employers to
offer accommodations to disabled employees without creating any conflict with the
agreements-provisions along the lines of: 'The employer may take all actions necessary to
comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act."' See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 63 (1990) reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 303, 346; accord S. REP. No. 101-116, at
32 (1989)).
216. For example, in Aka, 116 F.3d at 876, the plaintiff, Etim Aka, originally submitted his
claim to the internal arbitration process but, apparently, the arbitrator's decision "never even
referred to the ADA, the collective bargaining agreement's handicapped-transfer provision, or
'reasonable accommodation."' See id. at 893. As a result, the court refused to defer to the
arbitrator's decision and Etim Aka, after initially filing his grievance in 1993, continues to
litigate his claim today, six years later.
217. See Cole v. Burns hit'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
that the Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration as an effective alternative resolution
process for discrimination claims rests on "the assumption that 'competent, conscientious, and
impartial arbitrators' will be available to decide these cases" and explaining that "[gireater
reliance on private process to protect public rights imposes a professional obligation on
arbitrators to handle statutory issues only if they are prepared to fully protect the rights of
statutory grievants."). The Cole court also advocated the notion that judicial review of
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Arbitrators should also consider whether individual pre-dispute waivers of
statutory rights are entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and, in a union
context, whether the waivers are "clear and unmistakable." Moreover, all
arbitral processes should follow the lead of the Department of Labor
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (Dunlop
Commission) with respect to requirements for procedural fairness (i.e., due
process):
[I]f private arbitration is to serve as a legitimate form of private enforcement of public employment law, these systems must provide: [1 ] a neutral
arbitrator who knows the laws in question and understands the concerns of
the parties; [2] a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure
the necessary information to present his or her claim; [3] a fair method of
cost-sharing between the employer and employee to ensure affordable
access to the system for all employees; [4] the right to independent
representation if the employee wants it; [5] a range of remedies equal to
those available through litigation; [6] a written opinion by the arbitrator
explaining the rationale for the result; and [7] sufficient judicial review to
ensure that the result is consistent with the governing laws. 1
The effect and enforceability of union-negotiated arbitration clauses,
analagous to those found in individual employment contracts, which purport
to limit an individual plaintiff's right to pursue an ADA claim in federal court,
is a controversial issue and remains unresolved following the Supreme Court's
decision in the Wright case. 219 Admittedly, most courts have held that a
arbitration awards in discrimination cases should perhaps involve a heightened degree of
scrutiny because of the important substantive rights at stake. In this regard, the court explained
that arguments favoring "the arbitration of statutory claims are valid only if judicial review
under the 'manifest disregard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that
arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law." See id.
at 1487. The Cole court
concluded further that "there will be some cases in which novel or difficult legal issues are
presented demandingjudicialjudgrnent. In such cases, the courts are empowered to review the
arbitrator's award to ensure that its resolution of public law issues is correct." Id.
218. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT
30-31 (1994). The Dunlop Commission was chaired by John T. Dunlop, who is a former

Secretary of Labor and current Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.
219. The National Academy of Arbitrators has expressed opposition to mandatory
"arbitration as a condition of employment when it requires waiver of direct access to either a
judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights." NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS ON CONDITION OF

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS (adopted May 1997). Notwithstanding such opposition, the
National Academy of Arbitrators has also adopted specific guidelines for arbitrating statutory
employment disputes, which are in addition to the requirements of the Code of Professional
Responsibilityfor Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes. See NATIONAL ACADEMY
ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES ON ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER EMPLOYERPROMULGATED SYSTEMS, (adopted May 1997). The guidelines state, in part: "Members should
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collective union cannot bind an individual to a prospective waiver of his or her
statutory rights under employment discrimination laws. But, clearly,
submitting such claims to arbitration would alleviate much of the present
overflow on federal court dockets, and would allow employers and employees
to settle their disputes more practically and efficiently.220 As the Dunlop
Commission explained:
[L]itigation has become a less-than-ideal method of resolving employees'
public law claims. As spelled out in the Fact Finding Report, employees
bringing public law claims in court must endure long waiting periods as
governing agencies and the overburdened court system struggle to find
time to properly investigate and hear the complaint. Moreover, the average
profile of employee litigants ... indicates that lower-wage workers may not
fare as well as higher-wage professional in the litigation system; lowerwage workers are less able to afford the time required to pursue a court
complaint, and are less able to afford the time required to pursue a court
complaint, and are less likely to receive large monetary relief from juries.
Finally, the litigation model of dispute resolution seems to be dominated
by"ex-employee" complainants, indicating that the litigation system is less
than useful to employees who need redress for legitimate complaints, but
also wish to remain in their current jobs. 2 '
Unions and employers should not be foreclosed from agreeing to utilize
arbitral processes to resolve statutory claims under the ADA. However, in
order to properly demonstrate that a waiver of rights is knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to by individual employees who are represented by a labor
organization, any arbitration clause that is "clearly and unmistakably" aimed
at resolving statutory claims should perhaps, at a minimum, be signed, or not
signed, by each employee. Thus, each individual agreement could supplement
the remainder of a collective bargaining agreement which, by itself, might
only provide a mandatory and binding arbitration process for traditional
contract disputes. Furthermore, legitimate arbitration processes must strive

recognize that in adjudicating a statutory claim they are in some respects acting as substitutes
for a court rather than serving as the final step of a grievance procedure under a collective
at 1.
bargaining agreement." Id.
220. See generallyGarylee Cox, The AppropriateArenaforADA Disputes: Arbitrationor
Mediation?, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 591, 596 (1995) ("[One] thing that has been

proven over and over again is that any good ADR [Alternative Dispute Resolution] system
lowers the number of disputes.... The mere fact that a final and binding decision or a complete
discussion of the matter is an absolute right leads to more intense negotiations or faster
settlement.").
221.

COMMIssION ON THE FUTuRE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT

30 (1994) (quotation marks added).
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to afford employers and employees with a suitable forum in which to properly
resolve their statutory disputes.222
Notably, on July 10, 1997, the EEOC issued EEOC Notice No. 915.002
which expressed opposition to pre-dispute agreements requiring mandatory
binding arbitration of statutory claims, including those brought under the
ADA. 223 The EEOC explained its position by asserting that only the federal
courts should be charged with the responsibility of developing and interpreting
the law and, accordingly, by awarding damages in certain cases placed on the
public record, the courts provide society with notice of the costs of discrimination. 24 The EEOC also stated that "private actions serve not only the interests
of the claimant, but also those of the public, because such claimants serve as
private attorneys general. Conversely, the arbitration system is private and
allows for little public accountability. '' 225 Arbitration was also criticized as a
means of curtailing the development of the law and for not involving juries or
encouraging extensive discovery. 2 6 The EEOC further observed that, because

222. A specific example of a collective bargaining agreement's grievance-arbitration
process, that may be problematic as potentially applied to statutory discrimination claims, is the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1998 ("NBCWA"). The NBCWA, and
derivations thereof, which covers approximately 18,000 members of the United Mine Workers
ofAmerica, contains a non-discrimination clause that specifically cites the ADA, amongst other
statutes. However, in its grievance-arbitration clause, the NBCWA contains a provision
entitled: "Exclusion of Legal Counsel". See Article XXIII, Section (i). This provision states:
"Neither party will be represented by an attorney licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction [at
any step] of the grievance [-arbitration] procedure except by mutual agreement applicable only
to a particular case." Thus, a party who might be compelled to arbitrate a statutory dispute
under the NBCWA's procedures will apparently not have a right to counsel unless he or she is
able to obtain the consent of the opposing party. This eventuality may raise questions as to
whether the NBCWA's arbitral process provides an adequate forum for addressing antidiscrimination laws. Moreover, at least one circuit court of appeals has held that, under the
terms of the NBCWA, an arbitrator may not award punitive damages to a prevailing party. See
Island Creek Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers of America, 29 F.3d 126, 131 (4th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Fourth Circuit "has repeatedly held that an arbitrator may not
award punitive damages if the collective bargaining agreement does not expressly provide for
such an award," but also recognizing conflicting case law in other circuits). The absence of
punitive damage awards may raise additional concerns as to the sufficiency of the NBCWA's
grievance-arbitration process for the purpose of resolving employment-discrimination claims.
However, it should be noted that it is open to speculation whether the exclusion of legal counsel
and/or the unavailability of punitive awards are factors that render an arbitration process
inadequate where the parties have otherwise entered into a clear and unmistakable mandatory
agreement.
223. See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., AMERICANs WlTH DIsABILITIEs ACT HANDBOOK § 9.22,

at 44 (3d ed. 1997, Supp. 1998).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id

1999]

ARBITRATION

employers were usually repeat participants in the process, they had unfair
structural advantages over claimants.227
The EEOC's position, although not without support, perhaps overlooks
the possibility that a pre-dispute arbitration system may in fact offer a fair
outcome if the process is sufficiently developed and scrutinized. For example,
a built-in appeals process for the arbitration of statutory claims, one that is
more broad and rigorous than the traditional judicial review for arbitration
awards, could bolster a process where adequate justice could be achieved.
Along these lines, on March 3, 1998, the Education and the Workforce
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations held an oversight hearing to
review EEOC budget issues. The subcommittee heard testimony from several
witnesses who stressed the importance of alternative dispute resolution
processes for resolving workplace conflicts. One former EEOC Commissioner, Fred Alvarez, testified that the "EEOC could make a major contribution toward the prompt resolution of discrimination complaints if it embraced
rather than resisted employer-established ADR, including so-called 'mandatory' arbitration.... 2" Another former Commissioner, Cathie Shattuck,
testifying on behalf of the Society for Human Resource Management,
explained that the EEOC should "adopt policies which encourage employees
to use an employer's internal grievance procedure before EEOC begins to
process a charge... 2 9 Alvarez supported Shattuck's opinion by asserting
that "[t]he Commission should consider adopting the National Labor Relations
Board Collyer/Spielberg doctrine whereby it 'defers' consideration of
discrimination charges to an employer-established ADR system, so long as
that system has procedural and substantive safeguards."23 Suggestions for
227. See id at 45.
228. See 42 Daily Lab. Rep. AA-1 (March 4, 1998) (comments of Fred Alvarez, who
currently practices in Palo Alto, California with the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &

Rosati)
229. See id.

230. See id. The NLRB's "deferment" (i.e., pre-arbitration deferral) policy for certain
unfair labor practice charges requires exhaustion of arbitration remedies provided by a collective
bargaining agreement before the NLRB will attempt to resolve the case. Certain conditions
must be met before the "deferment" policy will be invoked. The NLRB's position is to defer
if:

there is a long-standing bargaining relationship between the parties;
there is no enmity by the employer toward the employee's exercise of rights;
the employer manifests a willingness to arbitrate;
the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause covers the dispute at issue;
and the contract and its meaning lie at the center of the dispute.
See CollyerInsulatedWire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837,842 (1971); see also United Technologies Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (NLRB 1984) (adding a sixth criterion to the five requirements for

"deferment" noted in Collyer: "The Respondent must, of course, waive any timeliness
provisions ofthe grievance arbitration clauses ofthe collective-bargaining agreement so that the
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new EEOC policies included establishing guidelines requiring minimum
standards for ADR systems, "inquiry from EEOC to the employer regarding
its procedures, including possible precertification from EEOC, a provision that
the time for filing a charge is tolled pending the conclusion of the employer
process, and a provision that a charging party may not be retaliated against for
using the process."23'
An arbitration process that incorporated these safeguards could provide
claimants and employers with a legitimate method for resolving disputes
internally and thereby relieve the EEOC and the court system of some of its
workload. Perhaps the EEOC should consider a "deferral" policy to
employer-sponsored arbitration where an internal system truly provides an
employee with a fair and complete resolution of his or her claim. Although
the EEOC's negative view of pre-dispute arbitration agreements may
accurately reflect deficiencies in many current arbitral processes, a more
creative future approach to utilizing alternative dispute resolution processes
to settle ADA claims may be on the horizon. More uniformity in arbitral
systems is probably needed, and a certification procedure for training
arbitrators in statutory employment laws and for legitimizing employersponsored arbitration processes would likely ameliorate many of the problems
noted by the EEOC in its policy statement. The current trend in claim filings
suggests that ADA cases will only increase as the Act gains more publicity
and the law continues to develop. A beneficent approach to alternative
dispute resolution mecahnisms such as arbitration is deserved, and such an
outlook will certainly assist in furthering Congress's intent in enacting the
ADA.

Union's grievance may be processed .... ). Alternatively, the NLRB's "deference" (i.e., postarbitration deferral) policy involves the level of deference to be given to an arbitrator's
resolution of an unfair labor practice claim. Certain conditions must also be met for the
"deference" policy to take effect. The NLRB's position in this scenario is to defer to an existing
arbitration award if:
the arbitration proceedings were fair and regular;
the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitration award;
the arbitration award was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
NLRA;
the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue; and
the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair
labor practice.
See SpielbergMfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574
(1984).
231. See 42 Daily Lab. Rep. AA-1 (Mar. 4, 1998).
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VII. CONCLUSION

The above proposals are intended to foster a more user-friendly and
readily available forum for the settlement of disability-related claims. They
are also intended to persuade labor arbitrators to examine more closely the
important legal implications of the ADA and its expanding influence as
applied to collective bargaining agreements. The arbitration process offers an
array of public and private benefits, and the ADA clearly embraces alternative
dispute resolution processes as a means to effectuate its purpose.232 Furthermore, the increasing complexity and expanding scope of the Act, as well as
other employment laws, have caused observers to rethink traditional notions
of the "law of the shop," and to reconsider exactly which rights, and whose
rights, are being affected by what were formerly one-dimensional employment
decisions.
Arbitrators are indeed valuable arms of the judicial system in our
country, and one can safely admit they have been officially recognized as such
by our highest courts. By this same token, however, today's arbitrators are
more than ever responsible for recognizing that the decision-making power
with which they are vested and entrusted may often require that they look
beyond the "four comers" of the labor contract at issue in order to achieve a
232. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the alternative
dispute resolution process of mediation, or a combination of mediation and arbitration
("med/arb"), may also be an effective method of resolving ADA claims. Mediation may be
particularly effective depending on the situation, because it is less structured than arbitration.
The designated mediator does not render a decision as an arbitrator would, but rather is given
the task of encouraging open communication and negotiation between the parties for the
purpose of eventual settlement. The free discourse involved in mediation may, at times, be even
more effective than the arbitral process for solving certain employment disputes, while
simultaneously minimizing the risk of permanent damage to the working relationship. The
arbitral forum may not always be proper for an employee's purpose because arbitration compels
parties to present their respective positions in a more rigid, adversarial setting where the result
is a binding, third-party determination. However, oftentimes arbitration can be a worthwhile
secondary step where preliminary attempts to mediate and settle a dispute fail. Mediation and
arbitration may be equally effective whether used in combination or as separate alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. The relative merits of one process as compared to the other is
beyond the scope of this paper, but the reader should recognize that employment disputes can
be appropriately resolved using either mediation or arbitration-or perhaps even other
alternative dispute resolution methods (e.g., minitrial). In essence, the ultimate goals at issue
are the conservation ofjudicial resources, quick and inexpensive results, and the preservation
of the employer-employee relationship. Employers and employees should consider the
particular facts and circumstances unique to their case and choose a mutually beneficial process
that will best serve their interests. For a thorough discussion comparing arbitration and
mediation as ways of resolving ADA disputes, see Garylee Cox, The AppropriateArena for
ADA Disputes:Arbitrationor Mediation?, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGALCOMMENT. 591,596 (1995)

("[W]e should not ever prohibit nor mandate any ADR system.... [I]t should be left flexible
....
").
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just and legally sound result. The ADA will certainly continue to create
crossroads with labor arbitration and will undoubtedly persevere on many
legal and social fronts. Therefore, it is crucial that informed, responsive, and
progressive steps are taken in charting a future course for this important piece
of legislation.

